Bin Laden’s insights and the Egyptian Coup

We sneer at Islamists for living in the past, but it is we who are foolish. We play the short game. They play the long game, regarding the present merely as part of the fabric of that which went before and that which is to come. We think the past doesn’t matter. They know that the destination is shaped by the journey.

Really great stuff Ian.

2 issues:

First, editing has always been your Achilles’ heel. Bin Laden was the first great man of the 21st century, you mean to say.

and, it was pointed out on a talk show today ( probably by Scarborough on MTP ) that Hillary Clinton is almost if not a neocon herself.

This won’t keep the feminists from voting for her, as Obama’s failure to bring the minority
economic plight out of the pits compared to when he took office hasn’t kept him from being very popular among minority ethnics, as he , also drone bombs more ruthlessly than Bush
and surges to stagnated defeat in Afghanistan.

Anybody who counsels against anti-Elite co-operation between, say, the Rand Paul (not Ted Cruz) libertarians and the Dennis Kucinich-kindred wing of the Democrat Party, or counsels against third party activism is a fool or a selfish provincial.

Ian,

A lot of links in what follows. My apologies if this triggers your comment filters.

mfi

Yes to everything you’ve said. But you might like to think a bit about the converse to this:

Let’s start with relation to Egypt.  A lot of people in Egypt and elsewhere see the Egyptian coup (it was a coup, don’t tell me otherwise) as being US backed.  Add to this the fact that they see the defeat of the Muslim brotherhood in the past as being aided by the US, they believe that Egypt is ruled by its current oligarchy (an extension of the Mubarak era oligarchy, and again, don’t even try and lie and say otherwise), because of the US.

There are a lot of people in Egypt and throughout the Arabic world who believe the opposite. Amongst them Sisi:

Excerpts from Washington Post interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi – The Washington Post:

The United States is very concerned about the sit-ins at Rabaa and Nahdet [two areas in Cairo where the Muslim Brotherhood has staged protests].

We really wonder: Where is the role of the United States and the European Union and all of the other international forces that are interested in the security, safety and well-being of Egypt?
Are the values of freedom and democracy exclusively exercised in your countries but other countries do not have the right to exercise the same values and enjoy the same environment? Have you seen the scores of millions of Egyptians calling for change in Tahrir? What is your response to that?

You left the Egyptians. You turned your back on the Egyptians, and they won’t forget that. Now you want to continue turning your backs on Egyptians? The U.S. interest and the popular will of the Egyptians don’t have to conflict. We always asked the U.S. officials to provide advice to the former president to overcome his problems.

What did the United States do?

The result is very obvious. Where is the economic support to Egypt from the U.S.? Even throughout the year when the former president was in office — where was the U.S. support to help the country restore its economy and overcome its dire needs?

(The interview is prominently reported in the pro-Military al-Ahram see: http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/901/25/224767/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%89/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%E2%80%8F%E2%80%8F-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%B8%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%87.aspx )

The thing is that Sisi is expressing a widely held belief. The belief that far from being in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood led government being overthrown the US government were opposed to the June 30th military coup and tried to prevent Morsi being overthrown. Some examples follow.  (As you’re no doubt familiar with by now my translator’s notes are in square brackets and ellipses represent excisions made in the interests of concision. Because many Arab newspapers use dynamic content management system an article’s URI can rapidly become outdated. But as usual I can supply you with a PDF of the original if you need it.

1. Amr Abdel Samih July 11th 2013 in al-Ahram: http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/877/11/220464/%C3%87%C3%A1%C3%87%C3%9A%C3%A3%C3%8F%C3%89/%C3%A4%C3%A5%C3%87%C3%AD%C3%9C%C3%9C%C3%9C%C3%9C%C3%89-%C3%87%C3%A1%C3%A3%C3%94%C3%9C%C3%9C%C3%9C%C3%9C%C3%9C%C3%91%C3%A6%C3%9A-%C3%87%C3%A1%C3%83%C3%A3%C3%91%C3%AD%C3%9F%C3%9C%C3%AD.aspx

التداعيات المترتبة علي ثورة‏30‏ يونيو لا تقتصر علي مصر فحسب لأن ماجري في بلدنا طوال العامين والنصف المنقضيين لا يمكن وصفه بانه مواجهة محلية بين قوي التقدم وقوي الرجعية وخلاص‏,

والا فإن طرحنا هو تبسيط مخل مفلطح وعبيط في شرح ما حدث.. وانما كان جزء كبير من مشهد مصر في تلك المرحلة يتمثل في المؤامرة الدولية التي أحاطت التباساتها منطقة الشرق الاوسط مشيعة قدرا كبيرا من الفوضي تحت لافتة مايسمي الربيع العربي, ومندفعة الي تصعيد الاحتجاج السياسي والاجتماعي العربي الداخلي للتخديم علي المسعي الدولي والامريكي بالذات, والذي كان يتصور أن مساندة تيار الاسلام السياسي أو الاخوان المسلمين سوف تساعد علي اجتذاب قوي التطرف والارهاب لتقصر توطنها علي بلادنا وتضمن مشاركتها في الحكم واستقرارها في أرضنا وبما يبعد خطر الارهاب عن الولايات المتحدة عبر تفجير هنا أو عملية هناك.
لقد التقي المشروع الامريكي للشرق الاوسط الكبير مع مشروع القوي الظلامية بإقامة دولة الخلافة وبدا أن تلك الهلاوس السياسية النظرية علي هذا الجانب أو ذاك ممكنة الحدوث والتحقق في خيال أصحابها.. لقد أراد الامريكان والظلاميين تثبيت متغير أفكار الدولة المدنية الحديثة في مصر وتأثير تيارات وروافد التيارات اليسارية والقومية والعلمانية, فضلا عن متغير التنوع الثقافي في دولة يعيش بين ظهرانيها عدد من ملايين المسيحيين وكنتيجة لكل ذلك فإن من شروط تحقيق هكذا مشروع سقوط مؤسسات الدولة المصرية بشكلها الذي عرفته في القرنين الماضيين, كل ما ذكرته الآن ـ هو متغيرات أراد كل من واشنطن والظلاميين تثبيتها ومحو تأثيرها وتحريك متغير واحد هو اقامة دولة الخلافة واستكمال بناء مشروع الشرق الاوسط الكبير.. وهذه ـ مرة أخري نتائج الاستسلام الامريكي للأفكار المعملية النظرية السياسية الخرقاء, وهي التي سحقتها ثورة30 يونيو ـ( في المنطقة كلها وليس مصر فقط).

Begin translation:

[The] consequences arising from the revolution of June 30, is not confined to Egypt alone because what happened in our country over the past two and a half months cannot be described as a domestic confrontation between the forces of progress and those of reactionaryism.

A large part of the Egyptian scene during this past stage star [recent past] actually represented an international conspiracy that included the entire area of the Middle East and that fomented a great deal of chaos under the banner of the so called Arab Spring. This conspiracy léd to the escalation of the domestic Arab political and social protests all in favour of the international and American plot. This plot imagined that supporting Political Islamist movement or the Muslim Brothers would lure in the radical and terrorist forces into confining their operations to their own countries. [The Americans believed that ] guaranteeing these forces’ participation in power and stability in our lands would shield the United States from the threat of [Islamic] terrorism.

The American project for the Great Middle East matched the project of those dark forces striving to establish an Islamic Caliphate. The people with those theoretical political hallucinations thought that their imaginary ideas could actually be realised. The Americans and the secretive forces wanted to revoke the principles of a modern, civil state in Egypt and they wanted to neutralise the effect of the leftist, nationalist, and secular forces. They also wanted to negate the cultural diversity in a state that includes millions of Christians.

This project would have resulted in the fall of the Egyptian state’ institutions. All the above [modern civil state etc. – mfi] are examples of variables that Washington and the conspiratioral forces wanted to negate all the while promoting one variable: that of establishing an Islamic Caliphate and completing the project of the Greater Middle East. Once again, the result of the Americans siding with the stupid and theoretical political ideas is that these ideas have been crushed by the June 30 revolution (in the entire region rather than just in Egypt).

End translation:

2. Abdullah al-Nibari writing in the July 10 2013 edition of the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Qabas: http://www.alqabas.com.kw/node/780404

Al-Nibari starts by making the entirely reasonable point that many of those who voted for Morsi did so to keep Ahmad Shafiq out. He goes on to say that the Americans pressured the Military Councilto transfer power fully to the duly elected civilian President. (بعد ذلك مارس الأميركان ضغوطاً على المجلس العسكري، آنذاك، لنقل السلطة وتسليمها بكامل الصلاحيات للرئيس المنتخب مدنياً. )

It’s what he says next that’s interesting:

وتوالت بعد ذلك زيارات الزعماء الأميركان من هيلاري كلينتون إلى خليفتها وزير الخارجية جون كيري، وكانت فلسفة الأميركان في المراهنة على الإخوان أن توليهم الحكم والإدارة السياسية لبلد بحجم مصر سيجعل منهم قوة معتدلة في مواجهة قوى الإرهاب الإسلامية المتطرفة من جهاديين وفروع القاعدة، لعلها تحد من أنشطتهم التخريبية، التي عانت منها أميركا والدول الغربية الأخرى.

Begin translation:

Then, followed the visits of the American officials starting with Hillary Clinton and then her successor Secretary of State John Kerry. By placing their bets on the Brothers, the American believed that, after gaining power in a major country like Egypt, the MBs would turn into a moderate power in the face of the radical Islamic forces including the Jihadists and the Al-Qai’dah elements thus reducing the terrorist activities and sabotage of such elements and providing relief to America and the other western countries from these activities.

End translation:

وكان أمل الأميركان أن يقتدي الإخوان في مصر بنموذج حزب العدالة في تركيا، الذي حقق استقراراً مع بقائه حليفاً لأميركا والدول الغربية.

Begin translation:

The Americans were hoping that the Muslim Brothers of Egypt would follow in the footsteps of the Justice Party in Turkey, which achieved stability by allying itself with America and the western countries. America wanted the Egyptian Brothers to tame the radical forces and to maintain friendly and positive relations with America in addition to preserving the security of Israel and committing to the Camp David accords. Morsi and his party met all these demands, most importantly the commitment to the so-called peace treaties with Israel.

End translation:

Al-Nibari goes on a bit more saying that Kerry tried to persuade Morsi to allow more political pluralism (yeah right) and that Morsi rejected this advice he goes on to say that the Brothers’ mistake was to concentrate on capturing the elite positions thereby taking their eye off what was going on in the Egytian street.

3. Editorial in the independent Emirati al-Khaleej Times on July 8th 2013: http://www.alkhaleej.ae/portal/c43deb2e-88d7-44af-8dcd-5724087cc07d.aspx which starts by listing everything the editor hates in the Ikhwani’s history.

وكانت ذروة تحالفاتهم المشبوهة لوصولهم إلى الحكم بعد ثورة 25 يناير مع الولايات المتحدة والدول الغربية استكمالاً لدورهم

Begin translation:

The pinnacle of their sneaky alliances consisted of an alliance with the USA and the Western governments in order to achieve power following the January 25 revolution.

End translation:

I could go on and on but you get the idea. All of this is important because as you’re no doubt aware the ideological ferment and the ideological innovations that drove Bin-Laden amongst others came not from Saudi but from Egypt. To use a bad western analogy. If Bin-Laden was Marx then al-Zawahiri was the Engels who radicalised him. 

All of which makes this part of your posting even more compelling:

We started with Egypt, so let’s bring it back there. If you’re an Egyptian who believes (accurately) that there was a coup which overthrew a democratically elected government, and that the US was complicit at best, and actively involved at worst (John Kerry constantly insisting there was no coup is not in America’s interests here), then the basic critique still resonates. Even if you don’t want bin Laden’s end goal of a new Islamic caliphate, if you want independence, if you want to be able to defeat your local tyrants, well, the US is your enemy, the far enemy whose existence makes defeating the near enemies impossible. It is not a country you feel you can make peace with, a devil you can ignore because it is far away, but a country whose ability to intervene in your country must be somehow destroyed.

To quote the American president whose administration started the current catastrophic phase of American hegemonism in the Middle East – "You ain’t seen nothing, yet".

mfi

Oops sorry my second Arabic extract from al-Nibari is missing a paragraph it should read:

وكان أمل الأميركان أن يقتدي الإخوان في مصر بنموذج حزب العدالة في تركيا، الذي حقق استقراراً مع بقائه حليفاً لأميركا والدول الغربية.

وما كانت تريده أميركا من الإخوان في مصر هو ترويض القوى المتطرفة وإبقاء علاقات ودية وصديقة مع أميركا، والمحافظة على أمن إسرائيل بالالتزام باتفاقيات كامب ديفيد، وقد لبى مرسي وجماعته هذه المطالب وأهمها الالتزام بما سمي باتفاقيات السلام مع إسرائيل، وأوفوا بشروط هذا الدور عندما لعبوا دوراً مهماً في الضغط على حماس في غزة للامتناع عن إرسال الصواريخ إلى الأراضي التي تحتلها إسرائيل في اتفاق إيقاف الحرب، التي شنّتها الأخيرة على غزة، وقد بقي هذا التعهد صامداً منذ ذلك الوقت.

Which translates as:

The Americans were hoping that the Muslim Brothers of Egypt would follow in the footsteps of the Justice Party in Turkey, which achieved stability by allying itself with America and the western countries.

America wanted the Egyptian Brothers to tame the radical forces and to maintain friendly and positive relations with America in addition to preserving the security of Israel and committing to the Camp David accords. Morsi and his party met all these demands, most importantly the commitment to the so-called peace treaties with Israel.

mfi

You’re right about Turkey. Food at least in the cities and I mean the basics are a lot more expensive than they were. Quality is down too. Erdogan’s base is the peasantry and the Islamist middle class. Many of whom are doing quite well. I think that his support will stay pretty strong for quite a while as most of those doing the demonstrating wouldn’t ever have voted for him in a fit.

There is another aspect to all of this and that’s the role of the military. Unlike Morsi Erdogan did defeat the Officer Corps it took him years but he did it. But but but what he’s never defeated is Kemalist Nationalism. What I’ve seen of the recent demonstrations in Turkey convinces that many of those demonstrating are cats paws by the Kemalists. Just as many of the suspiciously well-organised demonstrators in Egypt are cats paws for the Egyptian officer corps.

mfi

You’re certainly right about both the financialisation and the construction boom in Turkey. And that syndrome exists on steroids in the Iraki Kurdish governorates (Duhuk, Erbil and Sulaimaniya) which is a large part of the reason why Barzani is ramping up his confrontation with Baghdad. The money that fueled the boom is running out and he desperately needs more. If he can’t get more oil revenues and soon he’s going to be in a lot of trouble.

mfi

For those who are interested, I highly recommend Jake Tapper’s new book, “The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor”, released in November 2012. It is the story of Combat Outpost Keating, in the most remote, mountainous, and dangerous area of Afghanistan, in Nuristan province, just 14 miles from the border with Pakistan. COP Keating was overrun by a large Taliban attack in the early morning of October 3, 2009.

The use of the word “valor” in the title smacks of bravado, but if you approach Tapper’s account with some understanding of the fight in the U.S. military over the proper method of waging counter-insurgency warfare (in fact, the fight in the U.S. military over whether to even try waging counter-insurgency warfare), it will give you some insight into what went wrong, and what could have gone right, in Afghanistan.

In a word, empathy. The one year that COP Keating was held by a unit commanded by someone who truly regarded local Afghans with respect and empathy, the local Taliban insurgency shriveled and almost died. I venture to postulate that had the U.S. abandoned the policy of one year rotations, and kept that particular unit, and that particular commander, in place, the Afghans in that section of Nuristan would have killed off the Taliban on their own.

One little anecdote gives you the flavor. A few months after this particular US Army commander had established rapport with local Afghan leaders and elders, a Taliban sniper fired into the COP one night. Rather than call in airstrikes, or artillery, or even send out a patrol, what the commander did was early in the morning walk to the local village, and remonstrate with the local elders. Who then, over the next few days, took care of the problem on their own.

The COP Keating story is all the more remarkable because of the tactically ludicrous location the US Army chose to locate the COP. In the bottom of bowl, completely surrounded by mountains. Not on one side, not on two, not on three – surrounded on ALL sides by mountains. But the idea was to move in next to, get to know, and begin to operate with, the local population. The success of the outpost, given its utter lack of military defensibility — and moreover hopelessly remote from any meaningful reinforcement, including even timely air support not already pre-stationed in the area for that purpose — entirely depended on winning the support of the local population. And, as this particular commander showed, that depended on actually treating the local people with respect. Or, as Ian wrote at the end of June, “Start from common humanity.”

I was perhaps fortunate to have listened to the audio book almost immediately after listening to the audio book of Thomas Ricks’ new book, “The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today” which gives an excellent overview of how U.S. Army thinking and doctrine changed in response to the Vietnam War, including the founding of the School of Advanced Military Studies by Colonel Huba Wass de Czege in 1981, as a counterweight to the sclerotic hardening of US Army doctrine, as after Indochina, many Army officers wanted to focus solely on the problem of large mechanized combat operations on the plains of Central Europe against the Red Army.

Clearly, what Ian often writes about – start from common humanity – is the key to military effectiveness, as well as to ending the misuse of the U.S. military in perpetuating the American imperium. That is the sad irony, of course left untouched by both books: that even in those rare instances when you can get troops on the ground with a commander who understands the need for empathy, the effort by definition is wasted so long as US policy continues to be dominated by a plutocratic and oligarchic elite totally bereft of such empathy.

One other very interesting point, about Ricks’ book. His central theme is that the surprising military effectiveness of U.S. forces in World War 2 was largely the result of George C. Marshall’s system of quickly replacing colonels and generals who failed to deliver results. These replaced officers were not cashiered or sent home in disgrace; rather, it was recognized that they simply did not yet have the skills and nerve required to lead troops in combat, and were given other assignments more suitable to their skills and personalities. Often, these officers were later given another combat command when they were judged ready. Again, left unmentioned but clearly central to the story is the role of empathy. Ricks argues that Marshall’s system of replacing officers was lost in the Korean War, and the U.S. Army never recovered it, with disastrous results, especially for accountability. There is one brief section, perhaps no more than a paragraph or two, where Ricks traces the parallel between this collapse of accountability in the U.S. Army officer corps in the 1950s, with the rise of the corporate culture of the “organization man” as captured by William H. Whyte’s 1956 book of that title.

The intellectual origins of Zwahiri and Bin Laden’s world-view.

http://www.amazon.com/Sayyid-Qutb-Origins-Radical-Islamism/dp/0231701047/ref=pd_sim_b_4

Was the vocal minority funded by the International Republican Institute that overthew Musbarak democratic? Was the recent removal of Morsi democratic? How many of Egypt’s 81 millilon citizens had a say in either?

Yet these events are treatment differently by the American elite and Official Narrative, while vast majority of Egypt’s 81 million citizens were rob of basic rights like functioning society, working economy, political indepenence, strong national sovereignty – the very foundation of democracy.

The political analysis is very good, but the idea that the US is somehow running out of money (and will therefor fall/default) is absurd. The only time a first world nation with it own currency has fallen (defaulted) was the USSR, and that was strictly because the “Chicago Boys” convinced them that they were broke, not because they actually were. The reason why our un/underemployment remains high is because this same political faction is restricting the creation of the new monies needed to re-employ those people. And that’s not at all the same as running out of money, which the US cannot do.

[Note: By controlling (i.e., restricting) the creation of new money, the US literally sets its own un/underemployment rate at all times. Aside from natural job market friction, the US could choose to implement a zero percent un/underemployment rate at any time it wanted. Obviously, there are powerful political factions who do not think full employment is a good idea, and they are preventing this from occurring.]

In Islam there is an idea that you should deal with your local tyrant, your local problems, first, and not worry about the far enemy. Bin Laden believed that, in the current circumstance, you could not do that. Revolution at home was close to impossible because of the far enemy, because of the United States. Even if you did, by some miracle succeed, as long as the US was the global hegemon, your success would be undermined and destroyed by the US by crippling your economy, escalating, if necessary, to economic sanctions backed by force.

Some months ago, I left a few comments about how, in the Age of Energy, distance is abolished (wish this site had a better search feature, to dredge up this old stuff). Prior to this age, a hegemon had limited power that took awhile to amass and deploy to a far corner of the globe, and so it made sense for rebels to try and wrest power for themselves from the local tyrant first. In an age when long-distance warfare can be waged by joystick wielding combatants sitting in air conditioned trailers in Nevada – thus providing massive, instantaneous backup to the local tyrant – by the same advantages of this modern technology, it makes the hegemon’s jugular much more accessible to rebellious locals.

I would say that Bin Laden could be called a great man because he realized this, and was able to update the traditional Islamic maxim regarding who to fight, and he provided a world changing demonstration of it. It’s difficult for me to wrap my mind around “George Bush” and “great man” in the same sentence – I would say that Bush was the public relations face of a movement that did all the world changing things you wrote about in your post. Obama has a desk down the hall, in that very same movement.

A couple of quick comments:

1. It’s important to remember that Messages to the World only covers material up to the end of 2004. Strategy and thought have evolved significantly since then. It’s also worth reviewing Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner if one can come up with a translation, given current proprietorship.

2. The way the Afghan conflict unfurled didn’t really follow the original strategic precept (basically a complete replay of the struggle against the USSR with new, improved pan-Islamic rallying to the flag). Of course, one can argue pretty convincingly that the original conflict didn’t *either*. 😉 Bloody romantics.

3. An Iraq so tightly under the sway of the Iranians is hardly to be billed an unqualified success in al-Qa`eda’s eyes. Understand that and one gets a little closer to understanding the more peculiar aspects of things in current Syria.

4. More than anything, al-Qa`eda strategy should be viewed as improvisational. My view, if one doesn’t know a lot about the details, one is going to obscure more than reveal if one tries to “force” things into a narrative that sees this as folks “holding course” on a grand strategy formulated long ago. Is there some value to the lens, sure – but in my view more about the specifics has changed than stayed the same.

Off topic, but thought you’d like to see this, Ian.
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/aug/05/children-ban-talking-about-fracking

@ sufferinsuccotash, stupor mundi August 5, 2013

Can’t agree with you about Calvert’s book IMO Adnan Musallam’s From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism is far better.

But instead of spending money on either I suggest people familiarise themselves with Qutb’s life – almost any on-line biography will do and then instead of accepting somebody else’s pre-digested summaries read what Qutb wrote for yourself starting with:

Basic Principles of the Islamic World view

and continuing with

‘Milestones’

Reading both might even cure you of the Western delusion that Qutb’s followers are motivated exclusively or even primarily by US foreign policy. They aren’t anymore than Qutb was motivated exclusively or even primarily by his horror of what he saw and heard during his stay in the USA. Which brings me to ‘The America I Have Seen’ – I suggest you read this last because America and Americans simply weren’t all that important for Qutb. Qutb wasn’t writing for Americans or for Westerners his interest in America and the West came from the fact that he believed that Western societies were glittering but shallow distractions from the real zenith of human society which began with Prophet Mohammed and lasted throughout the Arab golden ages. Thus Western societies in general and America in particular were interesting only in that they were false solutions to the problem of how to live a good life. Qutb was interested in fostering intra-Muslim dialogue his rejection of westernism was a small albeit important part of what he was trying to say to his fellow Muslims.

Unless you’re very interested in Qur’anic exegesis and are fluent either in Arabic or Farsi don’t bother with any of the volumes of “In the shadow of the Qur’an” the translations available in English aren’t particularly good and in any case much of what Qutb wrote was lifted from Amin al-Kholi’s writings.

mfi

Ian, this thread is pretty amazing and somewhat brave of you. I’m very happy to see this; but Americans (most) will never try to gain knowledge for understanding, especially of Islam; they already have all of the facts they need; thanks to the U.S. propaganda machine.
A closed mind is a closed mind…pity, or maybe not.
Anyhoo, mfi; you constantly amaze with your depth of understanding and wealth of information. Many thanks to you both…

OBL wanted a islamic caliphate. The seculars, here and in the west and in Egypt itself do not. Choose the one you prefer

@ Tiresias
August 6, 2013
~~~~~~~~~~~~
On the morning of 9/11 my first words were; blow-back!
IMO, we’re following exactly what Bin Laden expected and to the end he predicted.
We’re unarguably in a downward spiral; beware the wrath of the dying beast…

@ markfromireland
August 6, 2013
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Oh, geez, Saturday Chorale is my meditation. Kudos once again…

Mark,

Getting too wedded to preconceived notions of whether the near enemy or the far enemy significantly predominates in their current worldview without getting immediately granular on the specific sub-theatre and affiliate organization involved would be an example of the type of thing I’m talking about. Folks seem to do that a lot. AQ have learned of experience and necessity to be a lot more supple about this type of thing. Central leadership certainly has going after the far enemy as a lens, but my read is that they’ve learned that they can’t push this too hard, the idea is far from being marked with universal enthusiasm from the “local” affiliates, and even many in the central leadership cadre are skeptical about whether their chances of success justify the risk and investment of time and resources, particularly at present. Effective strikes into western homelands do something for you, ineffective ones much less so and independent self starters are still lining up even if quality leaves much to be desired. Relatedly, an open question in my mind is what effect the change of paramount leader has had – Dr. Zawahiri was a heavy proponent of near enemy strategies early on and his transition has never really been explained in great detail to us outsiders: situational convenience or conviction derived of experience?

With regards to Lebanon, one thing that I do note is that militant Salafists who aren’t at a distance have learned to be perhaps a little more accommodating and a little more circumspect – much easier to talk about what a horror Shia power is from the comfort of one’s little enclave in the Gulf. The other much larger thing is what sort of long-term tensions Hizbullah is setting up for itself – if continuing to exist as an armed resistance force in the absence of Israel encroaching on significant chunks of Lebanese territory was a significant political challenge, being heavily and visibly involved in Syria on an ongoing basis has got to be something on another plane entirely. Their opponents are going to try and bleed them and it remains to be seen whether the “Basij-lite” approach is going to insulate them sufficiently. This has got to be sucking up a huge percentage of Nasrallah’s current focus and we’re already seeing that their enemy get a vote, even inside Lebanon.

@ JustPlainDave August 6, 2013

I have no idea who most of your first paragraph is aimed at or why you think it’s relevant. But as the information you need to know is in the public domain your problem about about Zawahiri is easily solved. First تعلم القراءة عربي then go here https://www.google.com/?hl=ar

As to your second paragraph I come across this particular set of USDOS talking points so often that I really write should write a canned response, any way here goes:

1: Lebanese militant salafists don’t tangle with Hizballah anymore because every time they’ve done it they’ve lost heavily.

2. “The other much larger thing is what sort of long-term tensions Hizbullah is setting up for itself – if continuing to exist as an armed resistance force in the absence of Israel encroaching on significant chunks of Lebanese territory was a significant political challenge”

Except that it wasn’t and isn’t challenge to them politically. Everybody in Lebanon knows what would happen if Hizballah who are after all part of Lebanon’s legally constituted armed forces were to relax their preparedness. The people in Southern Lebanon know this best of all. If you think that the fact that Israeli troops are not currently on the ground in Lebanon is a political challenge to the Hizb who drove them out then I suspect strongly that you’ve never been either to Southern Lebanon or to Southern Beirut or even to Lebanon. It is precisely because there are no longer Israeli troops “encroaching” as you put it that Hizb support in the South and in Southern Beirut is rock solid.

3. Their opponents are going to try and bleed them and it remains to be seen whether the “Basij-lite” approach is going to insulate them sufficiently.

“Basij-lite” is an impressive sounding but utterly meaningless phrase (but well done for coming up with it). I suppose it might impress somebody who doesn’t know a thing about either the Basiji or the IRGC or Hizballah but I doubt it’ll impress anyone else even slightly.

I know how the Basiji fought from seeing some of the battlefields on which they fought shortly after they’d fought there and from being told about it at first hand by survivors both amongst former basij and their opponents. Some of the friendships I developed then both in Iran and Irak persist to this day.

What Hizballah forces have been doing in Syria does not even remotely resemble Basiji usage in a war that does not even remotely resemble the war in which they fought it also doesn’t even remotely resemble how latter day basij are used.

In reality Hizballah commanders have been using third echelon troops from their reserves to fight and win battles against well-entrenched defenders and taking remarkably few casualties to do so. That says a lot for the effectiveness of Hizb training doctrines and practices. As an added benefit the commanders of what were previously third echelon troops now have blooded and experienced troops who they will be able to use to increase the effectiveness of their training programmes. It’s a win-win situation for the Hizb and always was. From inexperienced and not even fully trained reservists to a new cadre of experienced troops – what’s not to like .

4. “their enemy get a vote, even inside Lebanon”

Their enemy always have had a vote particularly inside Lebanon as have the Hizb that’s the whole point of Lebanon being the only Middle Eastern Arab country that has an established and well-developed democracy. You might like to note that because of favourable birth-rate differentials the Hizb proportion of that vote is rising.

I wish you people would come up with some fresh talking points. I’m getting bored.

TIA

mfi

I’m sorry Mark, were those your cornflakes I pissed in this morning? 😉 There was a time when I half-assed knew all sorts of entertaining phrases that would doubtless have had relevance if it was about 900AD or so, but had basically no utility on the ground – especially given my crap pronunciation. Another 23 year old biting the dust against a Level III language… In any case, I don’t think this is purely a language issue – there’s lots of folks who have looked at this over the previous 12 years and I would expect at least one to come up with something that makes sense if it was just source accessibility.

As to the rest, you seem to be filling in a lot of the gaps in what I’m saying with assumptions that I share popular American views of Hizbullah. Sorry to disappoint, but not so much with the Yanks here. We’re actually in agreement on much of what you say.

I would agree with you that the Salafis are circumspect because when they aren’t, they get their asses in a sling. Similarly, I would agree that support for Hizbullah is solid in their heartland – I don’t have any deep insight into it, but I haven’t heard any significant indications of discontent, even though I would expect the usual suspects to be crowing about it if there were. One thing that I have heard reported is Nasrallah specifically making the case for involvement in Syria – this I would read as an intelligent, pre-emptive move. It makes sense “out of area” involvement could become a tension, particularly if other external players were to poke at it – seeking to close it off and *explain* involvement is smart. The political challenge I speak of is with other non-Shia Lebanese players. I’ve read a pretty wide range of folks and they’re in unison as to saying the Israeli withdrawal was a challenge – one that was managed, but a challenge. That ties in with what I read in Blandford’s translations of his speeches – I can’t think why this would not be a challenge, particularly if they want broadly based political legitimacy not closely tied to overt power of arms.

I am not so sure that all of the Hizbullah troops that have been committed are the lower quality people. That notion doesn’t square well with how they were involved in/around Iraq and I would not assess this conflict as being so much less important to them that they’d try and do it on the cheap (additionally, their direct exposure is higher). That said, I don’t know how we’d assess quality from western sources. If you have different information, I’m all ears.

My somewhat flippant usage of Basij is more reflective of notions that they might be using local Syrian levies organized primarily along local lines – not intended to call to mind 14 year olds with plastic keys or the current political enforcer role. These guys are smart, they have considerable experience in irregular warfare and they have a demonstrated track record of being able to train up locals into effective forces. It makes sense to me that they will be running that strategy in preference to committing huge numbers of people, which are their highest value asset. Bluntly, I don’t believe the accounts of thousands of Hizbullah fighters, but they’ve been having success and the required numbers have to be coming from somewhere. Again, the notion that they would or could take third tier reservists and slot them into extremely challenging positions like this doesn’t make a lot of a priori sense to me, but if you have different information, again, I’m all ears.

As to the notion of the enemy getting a vote, sorry about the slang – all the folks I’ve ever known in CAN/US/UK forces know it (or were keeping their puzzlement to themselves). It doesn’t mean electoral politics, it means the enemy can affect one’s plans – as has been seen in the cross border strikes into Lebanon against Hizbullah of late. I’m quite familiar with the comparative demographics – didn’t spend a lot of time down south (and it was longer ago than I care to recall), but I spent enough and I’ve read enough to get that .

If you’re bored with the talking points, feel free to impute me some more interesting new ones. 🙂 I don’t think I could pull off something as exotic as exiled embittered ex-Ba`athist, but I’m game to try.

@ mfi;
I’ve been able to get a Qur’an, a dual language (Arabic/English) version, by
‘Abdullah Yûsuf ‘Ali.
Is it a good translation in your opinion? Thanks…

You’re getting your information from horribly biased sources if you think “the US was complicit at best, and actively involved at worst” in the Egypt coup.

I suggest you try and find any credible source supporting that line of though; you will be surprised. Facts should always come before ideology and narrative.

Mandos
August 10, 2013
C233: That’s the “complete translation with selected notes” edition?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
No. No selected notes. Just an index of the Sûrahs and content (reward, repentance, etc.).

@ Celsius 233

Sorry for the delay in replying I’m horribly busy and am only now catching up. There’s a joke about the Irish that if you ever ask an Irishman for directions he’ll start by saying "well I wouldn’t start from here", I’m afraid I’m about to live up to the stereotype. I don’t recommend Yusuf Ali because to my mind the English is horrible. It’s stiff and pompous and very far from what the Qur’an is like in the original. I hate the English in it because it’s what somebody who’d been deeply impressed by the King James Version of the Bible but who lacked the poetic talent that the KJV’s translators  had thought was appropriate for translating the Qur’an.  A lot of translations are like that but Pickthal and Yusuf Ali just make me shudder. Sorry!

So in an attempt to be helpful here’s my list of what I as a non-Muslim who is fairly well informed about Islam suggest for anglophone beginners who aren’t Muslim’s and who are new to the topic. (All links are to Amazon in the USA as I’m presuming the USA is easier for you).

I recommend two books:

The Qur’an (Oxford World’s Classics) Paperback: by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem (Translator):

http://www.amazon.com/The-Quran-Oxford-Worlds-Classics/dp/0199535957/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top

I like the English in the translation which is clear enough to let you – even as a beginner, follow the stories and the arguments and the lines of thought.  Each chapter has an introduction familairising you with the context and the verses are numbered but not chopped up into linguistically unwield sentences, instead it’s prose that flows and is easily followed. The Qur’an flows and this translation flows.  Ten out of ten from me and the translation I now suggest to all anglophones

and:

Understanding the Qur’an: Themes and Style Paperback by Muhammad Abdel Haleem (Author):

http://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Quran-Muhammad-Abdel-Haleem/dp/1845117891/ref=sr_1_1_title_0_main?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1376868967&sr=1-1

If  you’re new to the topic this a very well written and reflective introduction by a Muslim scholar who knows and loves what he’s talking about and is good at explaining it. The first chapter is a good introduction both to the Qur’an as a whole and its centrality to Muslim life. Good clear explanations of concepts and aspects of the faith follow throughout the book which explores themes in the Qur’an he’s not afraid to give examples (and comparisons) to material that most Christians or people from Christian cultures would be familiar with. His comparison of Al-Fatiha with the Lord’s prayer is very informative. Discussion and arguments are given in a crisp no-nonsense manner. Including material which will help you understand how different translators have understood the Qur’ans meaning .

Until very recently I used to suggest the 1956 translation by Dawood. It’s available from Penguin as part of their Penguin Classics range here’s the link to Amazon:

http://www.amazon.com/The-Koran-Penguin-Classics-Anonymous/dp/0140449205/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1376867813&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Koran+%28Penguin+Classics%29

It’s not a bad translation which dates from 1956 and to my mind has just enough notes and introductory material. You can pick it up fairly cheaply and there’s not enough variation between editions to make a difference.

So my suggestion for books:

If you buy nothing else buy Understanding the Qur’an: Themes and Style Paperback by Muhammad Abdel Haleem

If your budget and interest runs to both then buy Haleem’s translation and ‘Understanding the Qur’an’.

Otherwise go for Dawood.

On line resource:

A really good free on-line resource is here:

http://www.islamawakened.com/quran/

It’s a superb resource with multiple translations inclunding Haleem. Dip in and out if one translation is unclear try another.

All translations are commentary and the Qur’an is spectacularly beautiful. It’s can be very hard to recognise that the translations are the same book! Finally before you ask my favourite Surah is Surah 93 (The Morning Hours) it’s transcendentally beautiful in the original here’s my utterly inadequate attempt at a translation:

By the brightness of the dawn
and the stillness of the night.
Your Lord has not abandoned you nor is he angry.
And your future shall be better than your past
and your Lord is sure to give you that with which you will be well pleased.
Did he not find you an orphan and give you shelter?
Did he not find you astray and set you on the path
Did he not find you in want and make you independent?
Therefore do not treat the orphan unkindly
And do not scold the beggar:
But proclaim the bounty of your Lord

mfi

@ markfromireland
August 18, 2013
@ Celsius 233
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thank you for your not inconsiderable reply.
I left the U.S. 6 weeks after Bush invaded Iraq and been gone ever since, so Amazon’s not an easy source. However; it’s possible one of my siblings can take care of sourcing your suggestions.
The link will be invaluable for me here in S.E. Asia.
The southern three provinces here in Thailand are majority Muslim in a 95% Buddhist country. They have been fighting for more than a decade and it’s not clear to me how much is drug related and separatist related. I’m guessing it’s mostly religious separatism.
Between the Burmese religious strife and that here in Thailand (both Buddhist majority), it is now abundantly clear that Buddhism can not claim the mantle of pacifism and peace.
Anyhoo, I digress; thank you again for all your effort.

Yes, Surah 93 (The Morning Hours) is beautiful…

@ JPD

And to whom is this is aimed?