Let’s talk about Corbyn and Hezbollah and Iran.
These three things aren’t the same in many ways. But all three are fighting an entrenched system.
When Corbyn was leader, he had the majority of the membership behind him, he took control of the executive committee and he only lacked control of the MPs, who were almost all neoliberals united in hatred of him and his program.
This was a simple situation to deal with: Corbyn had the power to force re-selection: to make MPs face elections in their ridings. Almost all would have been replaced by left wingers: they weren’t popular and couldn’t win.
He refused.
He also had the power to replace the administrative class running the party and elections. He didn’t, and they sabotaged him. Without that sabotage he would have won the 2017 election, which was extremely close. This isn’t hyperbole, we have emails showing they deliberately sabotaged the campaign: they would rather the Tories win than Labour under Corbyn,
Starmer has had no such weakness: he has ruthlessly purged the party membership and leadership of left-wingers.
Now let’s turn to Hezbollah. They kept up steady pressure on Israel since October 7th, but they never seriously attacked. They did damage, for sure: most of the Northern settlements are abandoned and there has been a huge economic cost, but they never did what they could. They were scared, I think, of Israel attacking Lebanon.
(I’m running my annual fundraiser. If you value my writing and want more of it, please consider donating. Your donations really do keep this place running.)
Israel is now attacking Lebanon, hitting multiple hospitals, at least one orphanage and telling first responders that if they go to help injured civilians, they’ll be killed.
What Hezbollah wanted to avoid, happened.
Hezbollah really had two choices: go all in and attack with everything, or do nothing. Half-assing it was not smart. It let Israel choose the time of their attack and spend a year planning and executing, which has lead to the loss of much leadership and apparently a good chunk of Hezbollah’s missile stocks.
This is not 20-20 rear view sight. I said at the start of the war that Hezbollah should attack. Why wait for Israel to beat Hamas down, then turn on them? (Yes, Hamas is still fighting, but attacking when most of the Israeli military was in Gaza and before Hamas had been badly degraded is obviously optimal.)
Now, as for Iran, they too have been overly cautious. I’m impressed by their missile capacities, but they too are sitting on their asses. This is getting close to a North Korea/China situation and it’s time for them to just go all in and stop with the proxy bullshit. Send men and stop the crap.
Khameini himself is 70% of the way to understanding this. He said that the enemy comes for countries, and if you do not defend those countries, why then they eventually come for you. Iran is the end-goal. If Hezbollah is defeated conventionally (they won’t lose a long term guerilla war) then Iran is next.
Caution: building up resources, has served Iran well. But there is time for that, and a time for using the resources. Mao was a war leader, and one of the great generals of the 20th century. He was not afraid of war, and he understood when it was time to fight.
If Iran doesn’t, they put themselves at great risk. Including the possibility that they lose a lot of their weapon stocks in a pre-emptive attack. Are they less compromised by the Mossad than Hezbollah was? Are they sure?
The bombing and so on they seek to avoid will come to them anyway, just as it has to Hezbollah and Lebanon.
Either fight the war or give up, bow to the US and Israel and stop the Resistance.
(Machiavelli observed that most men don’t change. They keep doing the same thing they have always done, even when circumstances change to make old strategies ineffective. Hezbollah has a chance, because their old leadership is dead. Iran needs its old leadership to wake up before they wind up dead and Iran loses.)
What strikes me is our loss of leadership competency, from the extremely competent people who managed us through the depression and through WWII to the clowns of today.
I’ve been involved in Youtube exchanges where some idiot creates a video claiming how we “saved” the USSR in WWII via Lend-Lease. First, that is that factually untrue. The USSR saved itself; Lend-Lease was such a trickle in 1941-1942 that it had essentially NO effect on the Battle of Moscow in December 1941, and very little impact on the Battle of Stalingrad in the fall-winter of 1942. Stalingrad at the very least marks the point where “the USSR will survive and not lose” so Lend-Lease didn’t “save” the USSR. Lend-Lease did help the USSR, but the bulk of it (60 %) came in the last 10 months of WWII well after the USSR had turned the tide and driving back the Wehrmacht out of the USSR. The most important part of Lend-Lease help wasn’t the weapons we sent, nor the locomotives, nor the steel, nor the petrol, nor even the trucks (the most common ‘fact’ brought up). It was the food we sent–in 1942 42 % of the USSR’s arable land was occupied, and the USSR instituted a rationing program where soldiers, workers in essential industries, and children got first priority on food. If you weren’t one of those, you didn’t get much, and hunger contributed mightily to the USSR’s civilian death rate in the war. The FDR administration promised the USSR 10 % of US food production to help, but could only manage to deliver 3 %.
But my point in mentioning Lend-Lease is that such Youtubes miss the main reason why we did what we did in aiding the USSR. It wasn’t some act of friendship or mercy, we weren’t just ‘being nice’; we did it OUT OF ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST. George Marshall and the US military leadership were not sure we could win WWII without Soviet help; at the very least if the USSR went down to defeat and Hitler obtained access to the USSR’s resources it would prolong both the length and sacrifice of the US and UK. The military problem the US faced was war both in Europe and the Pacific, with far-flung bases and long supply lines that “ate” up manpower and required a powerful Navy and Air arm to protect. We thus couldn’t raise an army of hundreds of divisions and supply it overseas, to do the work that the Soviets were providing the West by grinding up the Wehrmacht. Keeping the Soviets in the war was quite vital; ergo Lend-Lease.
(I’m running my annual fundraiser. If you value my writing and want more of it, please consider donating. Your donations really do keep this place running.)
In short, Marshall and his ilk had a clear and correct notion of what the US could do, and what it couldn’t do. The manpower restrictions on ground forces meant “no land war in Asia” which meant we wouldn’t field armies in China. Instead, we focused on a ground force manpower-minimizing “island hopping” strategy where we only took relatively few key islands and just left Japanese ground forces in elsewhere stranded and cut-off from supply. The bulk of the ground forces we did raise were going be used to defeat Hitler, whom Marshall correctly identified as the biggest threat to the US, given Germany’s technological skills and industrial base.
This kind of calculation is what we’ve lost. In WWII, we knew we were powerful, in some ways relative to the world more powerful then than now, but we knew we couldn’t do everything and that we shouldn’t even try. But after WWII, inside the US spread the notion (largely spread by conservatives and the anti-communists) that we had really ‘done it all’ and won the war without much of anyone’s help. Why did we cave to Stalin at Yalta? Why didn’t we let Patton drive the Soviets out of Eastern Europe? We had the bomb after all! (cue in Henry Stimson rhetorically patting his coat pocket). WE WERE OMNIPOTENT!
The first generation who acted on this belief, a belief definitely not shared by those who planned and executed WWII, was the “Greatest Generation” who had fought it as common soldiers when they assumed leadership—JFK through Reagan/Bush I. It led to Vietnam and to interventions everywhere, because we could and should impose our will upon the world. It was exacerbated when (as you say) financial means of scoring economies replaced measures of actual industrial capacity and output, from Clinton to today. What gets me is that the US’s leadership is more arrogant and more convinced of its supremacy despite the fact by all objective measures, whatever power the US actually has is far less relative to the rest of the world than the US during WWII during Marshall’s and FDR’s time. Yet Marshall and FDR knew we weren’t omnipotent and couldn’t ‘do it all’. And I fear nothing less than a massive comeuppance will change their attitudes.