The core reason for America and Europe’s decline (and, in a way, Japan’s) was the belief by our elites that money was the only thing which mattered.
Money is the ability command resources from anyone who will, or must, sell. People who need to sell their labor or starve—Marx’s famous “whip of hunger.” Countries who must sell to get your money because you either make them militarily (see Venezuela right now and Iraq, both of which must sell their oil in US dollars and let the US treasury keep the money on account for them, then decide what they can spend it on, plus, of course the entire colonial era); or because they need to buy what you have.
For a long time the West had a monopoly on much of what you had to have: medicines, engines, planes, cars, tractors, fertilizer and so on. The Petrodollar was about having a monopoly on oil and all its products: gasoline, diesel, bunker fuel, jet fuel, plastics and fertilizer again. If you wanted electricity, well the equipment to make it came from the West too. If you wanted advanced weapons — the West, especially after the fall of the USSR.
During the early post war period you had options: you could get most of this from the West or the Soviets. But starting in the 70s, the USSR went into decline and then it fell, and the West was the only option.
Back to American elites: since everyone had to buy in dollars, and because they needed to get so much from the West, also had to sell in dollars, well having dollars was all that mattered. The more dollars, the more power.
What the elites forgot, thanks to complete retards like Francis Fukuyama, and sheer stupidity and greed was that smarter people than them had arranged the system this way: that it was contingent on the West having what everyone else needed, and having the military whip-hand.
Japan, poor fuckers, built an incredible industrial base and was pushing on taking the industrial lead. American leaders in the 80s, not having been taken over by complete retards made the Japanese sign the Plaza Accords, in which they would give that tech to America, open factories in the West and so on: give up their momentum, because it matters where you build.
As I’ve said many times, the tech lead follows the manufacturing floor: this is the LAW. Japan wasn’t strong enough to tell the US to go to hell. So they spent the last 4 decades in slow decline. This wasn’t primarily because of their big crash, though that was mishandled, but because they were no longer allowed to continue their industrial and technological snowball.
But by the 90s the last smart competent American elites were dead or retired, and the triumphalism over the fall of the USSR made them think, a la Fukuyama, that their system was superior, their shit didn’t stink, and they’d be on top forever. Everyone would have their system, and everyone would just keep buying and selling in dollars no matter what: it no longer mattered where things were made.
The key moment was when Clinton let China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) with developing world status. Western financiers (they weren’t capitalists, capitalists aren’t so stupid) looked at how cheap Chinese labor was and how willing they were to pollute and let workers get maimed, and they salivated. (And yes, lack of worker protections was part of it. One of my friends, in the 90s, visited a battery factory where the batteries were made by hand. Batteries are basically full of acid. Think it thru.)
So they sent industry to China and told themselves “well, we do the design here. That’s what matters.”
The Chinese leadership nodded, smiled and among themselves said, I’m sure, “what a bunch of suckers. Thank God they’re such idiots.”
And in learning to make all these things the Chinese learned the design and so on, and in time took the manufacturing lead. Then about 20 years later they took the tech lead decisively. Even three years ago American sanctions worried them.
(In 2023) Xi Jinping warned that U.S.-led technology restrictions posed “unprecedented severe challenges” to China’s development.
Today:
Han Wenxiu, the senior official overseeing day-to-day operations at the Central Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs (CCFEA) — the Party’s top economic policymaking body — told the China Development Forum (CDF):
“After years of effort, China’s indigenous innovation capacity has passed a critical inflection point, making it difficult for external forces to derail our development”
As for overcapacity, the Chinese are no longer apologizing for it or dancing around it. They say our companies are uncompetitive and that’s our problem.
The bet seems to be that most countries, or trading blocs, won’t get their acts together enough to materially push back against China’s export juggernaut.
- Even the U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods — unprecedented in recent history — have only succeed in diverting low-value manufactures (think toys, textiles, and fast fashion) away from the U.S. and toward new markets.
- They’ve had less impact on higher-value exports to the U.S. — either because those goods were never sold there at scale (i.e. NEVs) or were exempt from the tariff regime anyway (i.e. smartphones and medical equipment).
To put it simply, the world needs what China has and can’t make it themselves. If they can make it themselves, well, it’s much cheaper coming from China and how many Western countries are willing to take a big hit to re-start their industries, and are competent enough to pull it off? (My approximate count is zero.)
And that, folks, is the end of the Western order. No one needs to buy from us any more. They’d still like to sell to us, sure, but they don’t need to because they don’t need dollars. If it’s something they need they can get it from China or, to a lesser extent Russia, India and so on. We don’t have a monopoly on anything that matters any more: the last real one was chip manufacturing, but the Chinese are catching up fast and confident that in a few years they’ll be there. In the meantime, they can make all but the most advanced chips and those are the ones that go in almost all manufactured good: the most advanced stuff is only useful for things like AI, and China’s find its way around that.
Now we come to Iran. Iran is showing that a fairly modest kit: missiles and drones, is sufficient to keep the US navy and air force far away and make any attack prohibitively expensive in men and material. Plus everyone knows that expensive US military gear needs Chinese supplies: the West doesn’t have the full kit any more, the Chinese can and in some case have, cut the West off any time they want. All those expensive radars the Iranians blew up? Well it’s not the cost (that’s irrelevant) it’s that they require materials on the Chinese have. They get rebuilt if the Chinese let America and there’s basically nothing the US can do about that.
Keynes famously said “anything we can do, we can afford.” The corollary, as I’ve written before is that it doesn’t matter how much money you have, anything you can’t do you can’t afford—or rather you can’t afford it if the people who can do it won’t sell it to you.
America had a great thing going, for America and for its allies. But American elites got stupid and didn’t understand the actual structure upholding their power. They though it was innate to a superior system and superior people, not a structure built by very smart and ruthless people over a period of about a hundred and fifty years: a structure that required maintaining.
And so, it’s over. It’s just over and anyone who tells you otherwise has zero idea what they’re talking about.
And everyone else is realizing this. Let’s take Australia, run by ‘tards even stupider than America. Twenty years ago, they had eight refineries. Now they have two. They’re running out of diesel and even if they could get crude oil (certainly not impossible, though hard) it doesn’t matter, because they can’t refine it.
This lesson should have been learned during the Covid Pandemic when the West restricted medical supplies and the logistics system stopped delivering enough international goods.
Anything really important: fuel, machinery required to maintain your infrastructure, food, medicine, etc… is something that you should be able to make yourself. If you truly can’t, you must have huge stockpiles. I would never want a country to have stockpiles less than three years of medicines, food, parts for important machinery like the electrical grid, and fuel.
None of us do.
Anyway, the structure of Western dominance is now dismantled, by Westerners. Perhaps the Chinese could have industrialized fully without us, but it would have taken a lot longer and as long as we had our own industry and tech stack, it would have just meant a cold war situation with two blocs and, absent de-industrialization, perhaps the West could have held its own, though China is innately stronger than the USSR ever was, especially with Russia as an ally.
We did this to ourselves, or our elites did, because of sheer stupidity and arrogance. Don’t underestimate how bad this will be. I’m in the “better China as hegemon than America” crowd. I think they’ll kill a lot less people. But be clear, they are going to be a hegemon, at least in industrial terms and this is going to mean a serious standard of living drop in much of the West. Europe will get hit the hardest (especially Britain) but everyone’s going to get hit hard. A few of us may make the switch over to the hegemon on favorable terms. Canada and Australia have the best chance of doing this being large countries with tons of resources and relatively small populations, but it’s not a sure thing.
Dominance and prosperity are both structural. They are always created by competent leaders and populations and when their successors become complacent they are always lost.
That’s where we are.
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I saw an article today by the American Conservatives, who tend to be more sensible than most conservatives. It posits that peace can’t be made with Iran till Trump gets tough with Israel, because it’s Israel who keeps escalating.
