Every credit cycle is different: they don’t repeat, but they do rhyme at the end.
Phase One: the Expansion
The credit cycle begins when intense speculation drives asset prices into bubble territory. This time around AI is the prime mover. AI stocks have clearly inflated, irrationally, and dangerously market averages. Nvidia’s market cap ($4.9 trillion) is larger than India’s annual GDP ($4.5 trillion).
As Barton Biggs, a mentor-of-sorts when I was at Morgan Stanley, said about the dot-com bubble, “things that cannot go on forever, don’t.”
That rule applies to the 10 Horsemen of the AI-pocalypse.
The bubble will deflate, jus not the way you think.
It won’t go “boom” and pop all of a sudden. As Kathleen Tyson, a commenter as qualified as any to opine on this market, notes, “credit bubbles collapse from the periphery toward the centre [just as empires do]. Always. Overextension creates a vulnerable, unstable margin at the extremes.”
The bubble is here and it’s collapsing from the outside, just like a balloon does. Wrap your hands around an imaginary balloon and feel it lose gas. You can see it now, yeah?
So what does this mean? Well, it means we’ve reached the end of the beginning of the first part of this credit cycle. Part two is up next and it’ll be a like a rodeo-clown getting gored by a ten-tonne bull.
Phase Two: The Big Unwind
Phase two of the credit cycle is the credit unwind, read credit destruction, linked to insolvency concerns, similar to what FSK KKR is undergoing:
“FSK’s portfolio was hit by large markdowns in the fourth quarter on debt extended to software companies. The fund’s holdings in debt tied to janitorial services groups, and so-called roll-ups of dental clinics, veterinarians groups and defence contractors also saw markdowns.”
Other private credit shops that have taken some heavy markdowns and/or halted redemptions, as I disucss below. But seriously, if you know the private-equity model, you should be appalled their taking over janitorial serivices, dental clinics and veterinarians. Mom and pop shops par excellence. And they are now having the profitable assets stripped and the rest is larder with tons of debt and left out in the world to go bankrupt. I have a cousin in private equity and I’ve lost all respect for him. It’s probably mutual. I’m no role model.
But I digress . . .
The real kicker is our Bearn Stearns moment: an analog to the precise moment the 2008 Financial Crisis became inevitable. Recall summer 2007 when two Bear Stearns hedge funds met the guillotine. Blue Owl and it’s recent woes are this crisis’ first canary in the coal mine. Blue Owl, essentially an SPE/SPV for AI-hyperscalers to offload debt from their balance sheet, is ground zero for Oracle’s recent woes. SPE/SPVs, for those of you who don’t remember, are what killed Enron and destroyed AIG. Blue Owl vis-a-vis Oracle signals the end of the inflating bubble and beginning of the credit unwind.
“So who’s unwinding and why, you ask?”
The first-comer was Blue Owl. They got a rude wake up call when investors demanded $1.4 bn in redemptions, which forced Blue Owl to sell assets to meet redemption needs, in essence a fire sale. Every trader on the street worth his salt knew who was selling and what. It was brutal, as I’ve heard it told from some old Wall Street pals of mine.
Then Blackstone gets hammered with $1.7bln in redemptions and halts all redemptions. Blue Owl is a shadow lending facility for corporations, not individuals. But the next examples affect the money of individuals, billionaires that is.
So here comes Blackrock, sideswiped by $1.2bn in redemption requests, of which they honored only half of them. Resulting in a bunch of high net worth investors got sucker punched.
This ongoing and accelerating unwind in private credit is canary number two of our next credit crunch/crisis all the while the Fed is, unsuccessfully trying to backstop the slippery-slide of private credit into insolvent credit: on February 17th they injected $17.8bn into the debt markets via overnight repos.
So a lot of credit destruction has to happen—and will—before we get to the third and final phase.
We are a closing in, accelerating for sure. In fact, the appraoching crisis, because the mass fuckery of private credit does not have to legally disclose holdings, will make 2008 look like a Roman Holiday. No candles included.
Added at 9:30 AM Central Time: Teachers’ Pension Reportedly Loses $7 Billion in Private Equity Bets in 2025
“Ontario Teachers’ Posts First Private Equity Loss Since 2009”
If you run a pension fund and you invest the funds money with private equity you are shit. You are giving money to the very people that are strip mining this country’s middle class businesses. Regardless, the contagion is on. This thing is getting perilously close to becoming uncontainable. Remember that catchphrase form 2007-08? “It’s contained!”
Phase Three: the grand finalé.
Where credit cycles rhyme, as I said above, are how they end: on the last two syllables. Can you say it with me: Ponzi? In the end the ponzi finance bubble always collapses.
I suspect Crypto will be the first big Ponzi unwind. And it will take a lot of suckers with it. Plus, a damn lot of fools who worked for investment, commercial banks and private credit/equity shops. Crypto is bullshit, wrapped in dead fish skin that’s been perfumed by Chanel. No matter how good it smells, it’s rotten to the core. Crypto is to this financial crisis as CDOs and synthetic CDOs were to 2008.
The AI-hyperscalers will suffer as well, during the Ponzi unwind.
Why?
They are in essence engaging in a similar sort of vendor financing like CISCO and Juniper Networks did in the dot-com bubble. Nvidia is giving chips to AI-hyperscalers as collateral for loans. Never mind the chips will depreciate long before the earnings are solid enough for the AI-hyperscalers to payback the “loans.”
Once the AI driving stock bubble bursts, all hell breaks loose. One or two investment banks will go bust this time around. Maybe Morgan Stanley? Maybe Goldman? (I doubt Goldman goes bust, they’re too politically well connected.)
Note, as I and Ian have both said, this will be the final financial crisis the Fed is willing to backstop. Broad political support for a bailout hasn’t eroded completely.
But the next one? It’ll be unstoppable. Not only will the political will have evaporated, but so will have the resources to do so.
As we say down here in Texas, cowboy up, ride’s about to get real.
Nota bene: Phase Two of this credit cycle is accelerating: JPMorgan Restricts Private Credit Lending After Loan Markdowns. (Hey, Dimon can be a putz, but he’s a careful, shrewd banker.)
Key takeaway from my post at X: “JPMorgan Chase & Co. is restricting some lending to private credit funds after marking down the value of certain loans in their portfolios, according to a person familiar with the matter, in the latest sign of stress in the $1.8 trillion industry.” Morgan took a $22 billion haircut.
And this: “L&G’s solvency ratio — a measure of its ability to meet long-term financial obligations — declined to 203 per cent for 2025, down from 232 per cent in the previous year and below a Visible Alpha consensus of 217 per cent.” h/t for both stories go to Ventzu.
That’s some special fuckery there, folks.
Nota bene, bene: Good Morning from Germany, where today’s 10y govt bond auction technically failed.
Nota benissima: Well fuck, Cliffwater is the next domino to fall. First, huge redemption demands-to the tune of $33bn–at Cliffwater, LLC, force the private equity shop into a firesale a lá Blue Owl. So Cliffwater, LLC is a twofer!
And JPMorgan is dealing with some collateral stress issues. Whatever the fuck that means. When banksters make up words, be careful, you’re about to get screwed.
Even PIMCO piles on saying that they see “a crisis in bad underwriting in private credit.” Christian Stracke, president of PIMCO reiterated the headline news, “[this news] is the result of years of sloppy underwriting standards in lending.” Basically calling out the private credit/shadow credit industry for engaging in the 2007 equivalent NINJA–No income, no job–loans to any company that want cash. He also added, “there is a reckoning going on right now. . . . It’s not just a crisis of confidence, it’s a crisis of really bad underwriting.” Makes one wonder just how many cockroaches are going to come out of the dark, dank Wall Street kitchen this time around once the lights come on?
Phase Two of the credit crisis has arrived, and it came heavy.
This “issue” has flaired up again as Trump attacks Canada again.
But aren’t most of those contracts never expecting to take physical delivery? Just gambling, er excuse me, investment hedging?
Or is the problem that given that Comex price is under the real, that all those contracts *want* to be exercised in delivery so they can arbitrage to China (who has a real price?)
I’ve always found futures confusing, thanks for any help.
Answer is complex by I’ll do my best to simplify. I’m going to base my answer on much of what Dario says in this video, so it might be worth a watch for anyone interested in how the contracts are viewed at the Comex versus SHFE.
All contracts traded on Comex are designed to take physical delivery. Understood? They are designed for industrial hedging so corporations can smooth out their expenses on needed commodities. That said, under Clinton and accelerating under Bush, the CTFC made a whole raft of rule changes that changed the PRIME AIM of the commodities markets from honest price discovery into something resembling a casino. I’ll spare you the details, but I was in the business at the time and I still can’t believe what they did.
As for arbitraging Comex prices over those on the SHFE. Rumor is someone tried it–a Chinese trader–and got hammered hard. Main reason: the cost of shipping and arranging for delivery, even if, as rumored, he made the trade when there was a $20 USD premium at SHFE, and all the subsequent logistics of physical delivery, added up rather too quickly. But as a former arbitrage clerk myself, kudos to the brother for trying. Fortune does favor the bold. Until she doesn’t: fickle bitch she is.
Futures are identical to stock options: calls-are the expectation a stock will rise-and puts are the opposite. On the commodities exchanges you buy long exepcting the price to go up, but your buying price of the long give you the right to exercise it at that price not its current high, if it did go up. Buying short means you expect the commodity to go lower. You can also combine the two into a hedging bridge of sorts, where you give yourself the right to exercise the contracts within a range. This is what hedging truly is. Not hedgefund bullshit. I used to know the head commodities trader at Pioneer Flour Mills here in San Antonio and how he explained it was elegant. One of the reasons I went into the business.
I’ve never mentioned this before but what made me leave was a long time ago I was sitting first class next to a former international business man. He asked most of the questions, but the upshot is I was sitting next to John Perkins and the questions he asked me opened my eyes to what I was truly participating in. It was only a matter of time til I left.
The US commodities exchanges were originally established, and this was hammered into me when I took my commodities trader’s exam, for price discovery and sanctity of the market mechanism. Used to be you had to own or expect to take delivery of the underlying commodity you were hedging/selling/buying. Now you don’t.
At the SHFE the rules are much similar to the pre-Clinton era rule changes. And Chinese regulators are hardcore. They’ve shutdown at least 25 trading groups accounts last week alone for breaking the rules, which Dario explains in his video.
Hope this helped.