The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

Category: Trade Page 3 of 13

The Absolute Disaster Of Losing Dollar Privilege

Most of the world’s trade is done in dollars, even for trade that never goes to the US.

Most of the world’s money transfers at some point go thru the western banking system, and quite often an American bank, even if both parties are not in America. This is how the US justified its’ anti-FIFA case: the bribes, though at never point involving any Americans or going to America, at some point went thru a US bank on their way to their target.

Everyone needs (or needed) dollars, and everyone needed the Western banking system. There was no real alternative, and to a large extent there still isn’t.

But that has been changing. Russia (SFPS)  and China (CIPS) built their own interbank messaging and transfer systems to replace the West’s SWIFT. They have started to connect them together. Since the Ukraine war in particular, China and Russia have been encouraging countries to settle trade in local currencies, and oil has been sold in rubles and yuan (previously, with a few rare exceptions it was always in dollars.

This is called dollar privilege. It has disadvantages, but because everyone needs dollars and because a ton of world debt is denominated in dollars and because the interbank transfer system is controlled by the West (SWIFT is actually located in Europe), America has been able to command far more of the world’s resources than it otherwise would have been able to. Of course this is backed up by US and allied military power, and it was possible to create it because after WWII the US was both the greatest military power and the largest industrial power.

Still, while it was definitely abused during the cold war period, and more than once, it was after the collapse of the USSR that America really went wild with sanctions.

But the most important thing about dollar privilege is not the ability to sanction, it’s the ability to settle all debts in dollars, which everyone needs.

What happens when everyone doesn’t need them? What happens when the US actually has to pay, somehow, for what it consumes?

Though losing dollar privilege is second order, downstream from losing industrial and military dominance, and has been moved forward by the abuse (and failure) of the sanctions system, it will still be a massive blow to America. Put simply (and with some exceptions), America will have to live on what it can actually make and grown and what it can trade for with what it makes and grows. Well, and what it can steal with its still strong military.

This will be a massive blow.

It will also be an opportunity of sorts. Dollar privilege let the US command more of the world’s resources than otherwise, but it also made the dollar worth far more than it should have been, and thus increased costs in America. In principle (though hard to do in practice) the US dollar collapse caused by the end of dollar privilege would make American goods and services much cheaper overseas and improve the US terms of trade, allowing more manufacturing in the US.

In principle. In practice, the collapse in ability to command resources is likely to lead to economic collapse, and only a very savvy leadership class will be able to navigate the issue, at least in a timely manner. In the longer run, America is still a continental power and if it doesn’t split up, the country has significant advantages which may allow it to survive and even be moderately prosperous.

But when you see moves by the BRICS to create their own multinational interbanking system, and moves away from the US dollar, understand that what you’re seeing are attempts to end US hegemony; attempts which will have shattering effects on the US economy.


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German Dependence On China

So, the German central banks noted that 29% of German companies import essential parts and materials from China.

Multiple industries. Germany, much like the US, but even more so, let China pick up, among other things, much of the tool making industry, especially those related to auto manufacture.

 

Ouch.

When you consider this is an absolute terms and not relative, it’s even worse.

This comes on top of anti-Russia sanctions and the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines cutting off Germany’s access to cheap energy.

Germany is a relatively small country without a lot of natural resources. To be wealthy it needs to produce high value goods, and to do that it needs inexpensive inputs for its industries, or it needs to have much higher industrial productivity than everyone else.

Outsourcing so much of the supply chain for its manufacturers was an understandable mistake: it made those inputs cheaper.

But if you’re a small country without a lot of resources, you have to keep your supply chains and trading relationships stable. German leaders at the start of the Ukraine war expressed the most doubts about massive sanctions and they were right.

Germany is, as predicted at the time, in real trouble. Their model had flaws, and was a mean one, impoverishing and de-industrializing other EU nations, so there’s a certain irony to EU consensus Russia policy now screwing them over, but at this point if Germany goes down it’ll take the entire EU’s economy with it.

Germany cannot afford to follow the US into a cold trade war with China.

Moreover, this is a demonstration of something simple: what is good for Western EU countries and what most Eastern EU countries want (anti-Russia policies and NATO expansion) are two different things. Germany needs good relations with cheap resource suppliers and the only practical one was Russia.

It’s all very well to say, as many have, that this is the price of standing up for “freedom”, but if Germany goes down, so does the EU.

Likewise, what is “good” for the US, is not good for most European countries, and especially not good for Germany. (Ironically, Macron is the only major EU leader to be honest about this.)

The EU, if it continues on this course, will be reduced to an even weaker American satrapy than it was is the cold war period, and one with a lot worse living conditions.

China’s moving up the value chain. Sanctions against China, rather than slowing this down are speeding it up. Correct industrial policy would have been to negotiate with China about what industries or segments of industry each country is going to specialize in.

Incorrect policy is to have a cold war against both your cheapest energy supplier and the country that is now the world’s manufacturing floor.

Damn near suicidal policy, in fact.

Europeans need to get thru their heads that the European/American near monopoly on tech and high productivity is broken and that Europe, in particular, is coasting on legacy industry, without a great number of natural advantages. It was a backwater for most of history, and is reverting. The job of European leaders is to keep that reversion from happening for as long as possible and to slow down whatever reversion occurs.

Now, it could be that full commitment to a “US and Europe+Anglo countries” trade block, with full re-shoring would be a viable policy, if aggressively pursued, but that’s not what’s happening, the US is, instead, taking advantage of EU and German weakness to grab up high energy cost industries.

As for Europe’s elites, they should remember that owning overseas resources is dangerous. Britain’s “hidden empire” — its overseas investments, was a huge part of its strength, and essentially liquidated in WWI. Germany’s chemical patents and electrical patents were broken by the Allies in WWI and they didn’t reinstate them after the war was over.

Anything you own in another country doesn’t really belong to you unless you have the troops and willingness to occupy that country and the ability to then administer the country.

Germany in specific, and Europe in general, if they don’t change their policies and their commitment to being American satrapies, are on the path to ruin.

(Oh, and as I said at the time, most of the Eastern European countries should never have been let into either NATO or the EU. They offer little but vulnerability; are economic soaks, and have interests contrary to those of Western European countries. The only way they could have been absorbed effectively was if the EU decided to become a real federal nation with former countries reduced to provinces at most, and in most cases divided into multiple provinces.)


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US Chip Sanctions On China Appear To Be Failing Hard

Huawei, the first company to be slapped with sanctions, has announced a phone with 5G capability with domestic 7nm chips.

Huawei Technologies and China’s top chipmaker SMIC have built an advanced 7-nanometer processor to power its latest smartphone, according to a teardown report by analysis firm TechInsights.

Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro is powered by a new Kirin 9000s chip that was made in China by Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC)…

…The processor is the first to utilize SMIC’s most advanced 7nm technology and suggests the Chinese government is making some headway in attempts to build a domestic chip ecosystem, the research firm said…

…Buyers of the phone in China have been posting tear-down videos and sharing speed tests on social media that suggest the Mate 60 Pro is capable of download speeds exceeding those of top line 5G phones.

(Oh, and while it performs better in some ways than the best iPhone or Samsung, it costs about half of what they do.)

When I talked to an expert a couple years ago, he told me it would take many years to really deal with the sanctions because of the difficulty in creating the “tech that creates the tech.”

But that appears to not be true. The West didn’t ban lithography machines until nowish (the Dutch will export them till the end of the year), but…

Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE) is expected to deliver by year-end its proprietary SSA/800-10W, a 28-nm lithography machine, according to a report last week by Chinese newspaper Securities Daily.

This is less advanced than what you can get from the West, and there’s a scaling issue, but the idea that the Chinese won’t catch up is absurd and always has been, and no country can scale faster than the Chinese.

The end result of the chip bans will be that China winds up with the largest chip industry in the world, and I’d bet that in ten to fifteen years (and perhaps sooner, as they keep coming in before forecast) they will be slightly in advance of the West.

Scale matters. The West sent the world’s manufacturing floor to China, and just as when it moved to the US the Americans took the overall tech lead (with Germany the only real competitor at the time), China will take the tech lead.

These sanctions should have been used only a couple years prior to a war. (A war with China would be horrific, and the West is not ready for one, especially right now with the massive equipment and munitions draw down for Ukraine.)

Chinese aren’t stupid, the West is no longer special, having sold its patrimony and the idea that the Chinese were somehow incapable of catching up in tech if sanctioned was always ludicrous.


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The Supreme Stupidity of the “End of History” And Its Consequences

I remember the first time I heard of Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History”, and I remember thinking “no one can be stupid enough to believe that.”

But I knew I was wrong, because it kept popping up. The article became a book, even, and fools further down the intellectual stupidity chain made careers out of sub-theses, like Thomas Friedman’s “the world is flat”.

The thesis of the “End of History” was that the ideological wars were over: democratic market capitalism had won, everyone knew it, and history was in effect over because the great ideological war of the 20th century between capitalism/democracy, communism and fascism/democracy had ended. Everyone admitted that democratic capitalism had won and was the best system and now inevitably it would sweep the world and usher in an era of prosperity and relatively good government.

This is what elites wanted to hear after the fall of the USSR and Francis was the one to tell them. He was considered a great intellectual, made lots of money and elites proceeded to act as if he were right.

There were a lot of knock on consequences but there two were most important. The first was that without a competing model, western elites felt free to really rev up the immiseration train started by Reagan and Thacher. Post-war elites had been genuinely scared of Communism, in the “we could wind up dead” way and that had driven a lot of their acquiescence to cutting ordinary people a good deal. (A lot, not all. Much of it was just that the Great Depression cut their legs out from under them, and FDR then broke their kneecaps.)

The shipping of industry to allies and to the third world did not start at the end of the Cold War, but it did go into overdrive. The old police was to make sure that the countries it was sent to were not a real threat: either small to medium developing, or American allies. Now, however, the offshoring and outsourcing train traveled to China. Deng had opened up markets and privatized a large chunk of the economy, and Fukuyama had said that capitalism lead to democracy, so by shipping all that industry to China, well, the West would make them into a democracy.

The Chinese Communist party, in this storyline, were a bunch of suckers, who were inviting in the very forces which would overthrow them.

The line in poker is that if you don’t know who the sucker at the table is, it’s you, but the real danger is when you think someone else is the sucker, and they aren’t.

The CCP had understood Americans and the West very well. Ironically they were aided in this by Marxism and their belief that capitalists were blinded by greed. They offered Western elites cheap labor and high profits and dangled the dream of access to a market of a billion people.

There was a time when it was understood that what made countries mighty was industry, and that you kept the industry at home. In the post-war era that was relaxed: by you still didn’t send your industry to anyone who might well become an enemy.

But history was over and there were no enemies and the West, with its transnational elite largely shorn of patriotism figured they’d co-opt Chinese elites and make them no longer nationalist.

They didn’t understand that the CCP didn’t feel that way: they were proud of being Chinese and they also believed that if they lost power a lot of them would wind up dead. They obsessively studied the fall of the USSR (and its communist party) and were determined that wouldn’t happen to them. And they deeply resented the west, including America, for the “century of humiliation.”

Sure, they were willing to go to a mixed economy with a lot of capitalism, but they were determined to stay in charge and never become democratic capitalists, and they wanted to return China to its natural place as the richest and most important country in the world, a position it had occupied for most of the last 2,000 years (before that it was India, and before that it was Mesopotamia with Egyptian interregnums.)

So you had two bets. The West, led by America, bet that if they shipped industry to China, China would become just another country like them, happy to be part of an international community running on laws that had been created when China was at its weakest.

The Chinese Communist Party bet that they could let some capitalism in and catch up in technology, and even exceed the West in terms of industrial base.

We now know who was right, and it wasn’t the West. Our tech boycotts are a sign of weakness, not strength. We know we can’t stay ahead of them without restricting their access, but it’s very much a case of slamming the barn door after the horses have left. The tech lead moves to where the manufacturing floor is. Britain stayed in the lead technologically for about 20 years after the US became the manufacturing power, for example, but it was a lagging indicator, and ironically Britain had done the same thing America has done with China: it invested big time, built the factories and transferred a ton of tech.

Fukuyama was full of it. He sold a fairy tale to an elite desperate to believe they had won forever and he in selling it and they in believing it took the exact steps required to ensure it wasn’t true, by empowering the only nation in the world strong enough to challenge America. (India was never in the running due to severe corruption and governance issues.)

But the people who engaged in this foolishness (from the POV of the Americ and its allies) reaped their mortal reward: the elites became stinking rich, and Fukuyama become wealthy and was regarded as a genius for telling the story his audience wanted to hear, even if it was obviously wrong.

History never ends. There is no end-state ideology or system and when someone tells you the world is exactly as wonderful as you want it to be, run.


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As China Rises, Europe Falls

Some interesting news in the semiconductor wars:

Now, ASML had indeed opposed US restrictions. They said explicitly that in the case of sanctions, China would learn how to make the machines themselves.

Europe’s technological lead is being destroyed by following US policies. Energy intensive firms are fleeing Europe because US energy prices are much lower (this is due to sanctions on Russia and the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines) and following US sanctions on China means that China just learns how to make what Europe supplies them now.

It’s sort of rocket science, actually. As you may remember, the US banned China from the International Space Station, so China just built its own and now looks likely to have a base on the moon before the US.

Woops.

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China, to repeat myself, is the world manufacturing floor. Mercedes moved their auto-design center to China. When the US took the lead over the UK in manufacturing, the UK retained its tech lead for about 20 years, but it did lose it.

Repeated sanctions on any area where the West has the lead, whether space, aerospace, semis or anything else only provide a perfect complete tariff to a country with millions of engineers and scientists and more manufacturing capacity than any other country in the world. They speed up, not slow down, the day when China will both have the tech lead and the manufacturing base.

Back in the late 90s and the early 2000s I warned, repeatedly, against transferring the manufacturing floor to China. That was the decision point, that was when it could have been stopped.

Sanctions against key points only make sense if you’re going to either go to war or move massively back to industrial policy, and the West is not going to do either of those things. I’m not sure a full move to industrial policy would even work, but it’s certainly what should be done. However, it could only be done if you were willing to crash real-estate and securities prices by about two-thirds, because the cost-structure matters.

What Europe should be doing is aligning itself with the rising power, China, or remaining a neutral bloc and negotiation places where they will keep the tech lead with China, as part of specialization. China wants trading partners and they see benefits in not having to rush every tech sector out of fear of sanctions. The US is both going down and fundamentally, at a policy level, willing to feast on Europe to slow its decline. Euro elites though they were part of a trans-Atlantic elite, but they only sort of were. When push comes to shove, American elites will let Euro elites swing. Generations of dominance have created an American elite willing to almost anything, or perhaps even anything, to retain dominance.

Europe has hitched itself to the wrong ship, and trusted the wrong nation, thinking that being a satrapy is the same as being an equal ally, and they have joined a cold war that will hurt them more than help them.

They will pay the price.

 

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A New Age Of Vertical Integration

There was a time when companies preferred vertical integration: they wanted to own their supply chain. Then, for a long time, the mantra was to concentrate on one’s core business and let other specialists take care of all the non-core parts of your business.

Well…

This is no longer viable business practice. In a period of civilization collapse supply chains become unreliable: you may not be able to get what you want or you may not be able to get it at a price you can afford.

Supply chains will become more unreliable as time goes on. Leaving aside the fact that logistics companies make out like bandits during periods of supply constraints and thus have little incentive to fix the problem, climate change, environmental collapse and the new era of cold and hot war will make supplies more and more unreliable and scarce.

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The more something matters, the more this will be true: many countries couldn’t get vaccines, no matter what, and countries which created them gave them to themselves and their allies first. When water, food, minerals and energy becomes scarce, countries and companies will prioritize themselves first, their allies second and everyone else not at all. Strong countries, faced with famine, will not export food they need, and weak countries will be forced to export resources they need even if it means death and deprivation for their people.

If you need something, you better make it yourself, or be in lockstep with a company or country who needs you as much as you need them.

The smaller you are, the worse this will get. Amid the shortages of the pandemic small and medium enterprises, including stores were largely cut off: the biggest customers got served first and everyone else got the scraps.

A reliable supply chain and predictable politics are necessary for ages where companies and countries specialize. Eras of war and decline and collapse are eres of vertical integration and keeping ones suppliers close. The extreme version of this was feudalism: make or grow everything you have locally, because you can’t count on anything more than a day’s travel.

Most areas of the developed world won’t wind up that bad for some time yet, but that’s the extreme end of the road we’re on. Hopefully we’ll never get there, but wise countries and companies will no longer rely on widespread supply chains they have no control over.

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Losing the Power of the Printing Press

If you look up whether governments can “just print more money,” what you’ll find at most sites is the answer, “No, because it only increases the amount of money, not the amount of economic activity.”

This is not true, and it’s not true in a number of ways.

If there is under-utilization of capacity, you can print. Here’s US capacity:

The US has been running substantially under capacity for a long time.

But, you say, there was a lot of money printing (private and public, most money is created by banks, brokerages, and so on), and capacity utilization didn’t go up. In fact, it went down.

Well, yes, because the money went to other countries like China, where it increased capacity vastly, or it went into assets (the housing bubble, stock bubbles, and so on), or it bought private jets and yachts and so on.

Which is to say, it’s not just about money creation; it’s about who gets the money. Since virtually all the money creation of the past 40+ years has gone to rich people, capacity has been created for what they want. And because it was cheaper and more profitable to build capacity overseas, that’s where the money created went.

In addition, there’s the fact that the US dollar is used to buy oil and is the general medium of exchange in most foreign trade. It’s also the “gold” currency, in that during crises it tends to go up, so people want to hold a store of it against bad times.

All of these factors are contingent. If oil was not sold primarily in dollars, or trade settled in dollars, for example, there’d be a lot less demand for dollars. If the trade regime didn’t allow for vast imports and exports, but the world was more autarchic, then building new industry overseas wouldn’t make any sense, and so on.

This is to say, nothing is eternal. The dollar’s position is a historical artifact, based on specific circumstances which did not, and will not, always exist.

Remember, there was a time when the center of the world economy was Britain (chart from Mike Todd).

What you see in that chart (and it’s going to keep getting worse) is the switch from London to New York; from the pound to the dollar, because the pound wasn’t the primary international currency any more AND (and this is important) the UK kept de-industrializing so there was less and less relative demand for its products, though the City of London retained an important financial role, which kept the pound higher than the economic situation of Britain would otherwise have allowed.

Developing countries, as a rule, cannot run the printing the press because people only want enough of their currency to buy whatever goods and services they produce. In addition, because most Third World countries have vast import requirements (more so as time has gone on), and their agricultural bases have been destroyed, printing money causes inflation very fast. It’s not just an internal matter, more money chasing goods, it’s that people try and use the new money to buy goods produced externally, and their exchange rate collapses.

When the US prints money, a lot of it goes into other countries reserves and the reserves of people and companies. It pools, as it were, uselessly, and to the extent that it is “more money chasing the same goods,” its effect is spread over most of the world and not just internally.

Once this was true of the British pound.

The original conception of comparative advantage was based on the assumption (true at the time) that money mostly pooled inside countries and could not be used to create production in other countries. If Britain produced less widgets because French widgets were cheaper, the money freed up in Britain would go to produce something in which they had a comparative advantage, say woolens, instead of fleeing overseas. (See Ricardo’s Caveat for the long form of why comparative advantage doesn’t work with free capital flows.)

Now, you can also print money if you give it to the useless classes, i.e., the rich. In that case, it drives bubbles (see the SPX chart above or art prices) or creates niche markets, like yachts and private jets. It doesn’t drive general inflation, it only drives inflation for what useless people want.

Unfortunately, that inflation does eventually cause various crises, but for a time, it seems “free” — you make the rich much richer without causing widespread inflation.

What matters, then, is who you give the money to, and what they spend it on. Volcker crushed wages because, in addition to wanting to make useless people richer, he didn’t want ordinary people to have more money because they would spend it on things which lead to buying more oil, and given oil prices at the time, that would lead to more inflation. He needed to smash oil prices, and he did so by smashing wages to smash oil demand.

If you print money and give it to ordinary people, and it just leads to them buying more stuff from overseas, it won’t move that capacity utilization number you see in the chart at the top very much.

But this isn’t to say that printing money doesn’t “work.” It does work. It always does something. Someone benefits. If you print a bunch of money, and make sure it goes to ordinary people in your country, and that your country increases utilization and/or increases how much it produces, then it can produce a general wave of prosperity. After all, when wages rise higher than the cost of goods and services, that’s prosperity, but companies don’t like that unless they’re still making more money because they’re selling more overall.

(That last sentence, by the way, is the secret of the post-war good era. Meditate upon it.)

You lose the power of the printing press when no one wants your currency because you can’t produce enough, or increase production, AND it isn’t necessary for other things (like international trade).

This goes in stages. Britain, outside of the EU and with less and less industry, and with less reason to send money to the City of London, is in danger of losing the power of the printing press in the way Third World countries do. “There’s no reason to buy any more of this than however much you need to buy their goods.”

At that point, you need to figure out how to re-industrialize and under a free trade order like the neoliberal one, that’s hard. Every time you try, money floods out of your country instead of increasing activity inside of it.

As for the US, it’s in an extraordinarily privileged position, but as China and the BRICS move to conduct more and more trade without dollars, and as trust in the US to run the international monetary system drops and drops due to repeated sanctions and thefts of reserves, that privilege will decline, and the US will find more and more that if it wants goods from another country, it will need to provide not dollars (though they may still be exchanged), but actual goods and services itself.

If you can’t pay with goods and services, you pay by selling your patrimony — companies, land, resources, etc.

The power of the printing press is great, but it can be used for ill and good. It can create real economic growth and widespread prosperity under the right conditions, conditions which are partially under a country’s control. But if you become too weak or poor, you can lose even the theoretical ability to create those conditions. There is essentially nothing most African countries can do to restore enough sovereignty to allow them to use the printing press for good, and if you’re a relatively rich country which does still have the freedom of the printing press, there is always the temptation to use it foolishly or venally, as the US mostly has in recent generations.

Money is a social creation. So is how we run the economy. It can be made to work for everyone, for a few people, or as a machine of impoverishment. The choice, on aggregate, is ours.

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The Great Favor the West Is Doing China by Banning Equipment Needed to Make Chips

We really are run by fools.

“If you shut out [China] with export control, [they’ll] strive toward tech sovereignty… [Then] they’ll be able to do it all by themselves and the market [for European suppliers] will be gone.”

The great problem in the neoliberal era is that the usual road for tech and industrial catch-up, protectionist tariffs is mostly closed. (This is how Britain, the US, and almost everyone created their industrial base and caught up in tech.)

Despite what a lot of people seem to think, China isn’t a command economy. It’s a capitalist one, albeit with a large state company sector. Letting markets in is explicitly how Deng created the Chinese economic miracle.

So China buys a lot from other countries. It is a trading state, and that makes it more difficult to catch up in some techs.

Now, if this was done to, say, Bangladesh, or probably even India, those countries would be screwed — they don’t have the industrial and knowledge base. But China has these things; sure, it wasn’t cost-effective to do all the research necessary to learn how to make this equipment when they could just buy it, and after all, they need to buy some things from their customers.

But if they can’t buy it, they can learn how to make it themselves. Sure, it’ll cost them two or three years. It’ll hurt. But they’ll get over it, and then they can make it for themselves.

The knock-on effect is fun, though: Once China can make this equipment, they can sell it to other countries, which means those countries (Brazil, Iran, India, etc.) don’t need to get it from the West, and sanctions become much less effective because there’s another option on the table.

So by sanctioning China, the West will soon lose its ability to sanction not just China but pretty much the rest of the world.

Fun!

This is also true of the sanctions on aircraft equipment, by the way. China, which has a rather advanced space industry, will learn how to make its own civilian aircraft, and then, instead of everyone having to get aircraft from Europe (Airbus) or the US (Boeing, though Boeing is losing the ability make aircraft), they’ll be able to get it from China (and possibly Russia as well).

Now sanctions like these have their place: You do them just before you’re about to declare war. But if we aren’t going to do that (and there are certainly factions in Washington who do want a war with China soon), then it’s just foolishness.

Let’s hope it’s just foolishness.

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