Ian Welsh

The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

Category: Trade Page 6 of 13

The Shortages Will Get Worse Before They Get Better

By

On October 12, 2021

Comments

… so stock up if you can.

Depending where you are there may also be rotating power brown-outs or shortages or heating and auto-fuel.

Don’t wait on this, buy now. It’s unlikely most of you can do much about fuel or power outs, but if you can, do. For example, if you have a fireplace or wood stove, stock up on wood. You can buy chargers for your small electronic devices; blankets or sleeping bags rated for real cold, and so on.

Not all areas will have power issues, you’ll have to do a bit of research to see if your area is vulnerable.

Meanwhile stock up the normal purchases: staples, water, medicine and so on. This means keeping a larger supply on hand than you would normally to buffer supply chain shocks.

Remember that the shortage of items which require semiconductors will continue for some time. Not only is there a global shortage, but the US embargo on China causes real issues because China is where final assembly of many products is done: if they can’t get the chips they need, those items don’t get finished.

I’m going to write more on why this happened because it’s not just about Covid, it’s about a system where this was inevitable if the system got hit by big shocks, but I don’t want to dilute this particular post’s message that  you should personally prepare.

(My writing helps pay my rent and buys me food. So please consider subscribing or donating if you like my writing.)

How The Structure Of The World Economy Made Shortages Inevitable

By

On October 7, 2021

Comments

For the second time I find myself referring readers to an essay by John Michael Greer, this time on shortages. This is the best piece I’ve read on the issue and I agree with almost everything he says. JMG’s overall worldview isn’t mine, but he’s unquestionably brilliant, and this has been nailed. Go, read.

I want to note, as does JMG, than none of this is unexpected: the fact that the just-in-time inventory and ordering system was obviously subject to shocks is a warning given by many.

I want to emphasize, though, that it’s not only “just in time”, it’s the structure of production itself, which is both very dispersed and very centralized. A final assembly factory may draw parts from dozens of other factories, none of them near it, so when one of those factories goes down, the entire show can draw to a halt.

This dispersion was a deliberate choice. Some of it started as early as the fifties, as a deliberate way to tie economies together and attempt to avoid WWIII thru mutual dependence, but as with most of our economic pathologies, it really took off after 1980 and Reagan, with the vast offshoring and outshoring of industry and production: we were told the choice was to seek the lowest costs and highest profits.

None of this was necessary; the proper use of trade and industrial policy could, and I would say, should, have been to encourage every country to produce what it could in its own country, only importing what it couldn’t make or grow itself. Comparative advantage is, and always has been, garbage and no great state has ever allowed it to determine anything. Britain didn’t industrialize under”free” trade and neither did America or Japan or anyone else of significance.

But doing it this wasn’t mostly about profits and costs; it was about tying the world together in a way which disempowered every country outside the core. The so-called value chains were initially all controlled from the West or, perhaps Japan or South Korea. Everyone paid a vig to the controlling interests in the West: the rich did very very well, they just didn’t pay their fellow countrymen and women.

This was excellent, from their point of view, because money is power and it broke the power of their domestic opposition: absolutely gutting unions, the working and eventually the middle class, leaving them completely in charge.

Meanwhile, because of the dispersion of manufacturing and its inputs, other countries mostly couldn’t create any industry they really controlled (again, South Korea, Germany, Japan are exceptions), so there was not threat.

Until they got too greedy, and the Chinese saw their weakness, and they put so much in China while China had a policy of grabbing as much knowledge of how to produce as possible.

Which leaves us where we are today: vastly vulnerable supply and manufacturing chains, an onrushing cold War, and a struggle over who controls the “value chains.”

The Chinese are damn tired of paying the West its vig because the West is at the top of value chains where most of the work is done in China or other countries. Equally they are sick of paying for IP.

US elites, on the other hand, are terrified of losing their top-seat position; their ability take a big percentage of all profits because they own the IP and control the value chains.

There are no good actors here, be clear: the Chinese have done reprehensible things and so have the Americans. But understand that America was a known IP scofflaw in the 19th century, when it was industrializing (and the Brits were stupid enough to ship know-how and factories to the US for “profits”.)

This is a standard pattern, and as long as we make it so that a few countries can skim off everyone else the struggle will always be ferocious.

John Maynard Keynes wanted to end this: he wanted a world in which every country, as noted before, produced as much of what it needed as it reasonably and was allowed to use subsidies and tariffs and policies to do this.

We created a different world; a world in which everyone was dependent, most countries couldn’t even feed themselves, and everyone needed everyone else while a few countries, but especially the US, still remained in overall control of production (again, until US elites got too stupid and greedy and the Chinese took advantage (you can’t cheat an honest man.) Some of the reasons were good, if misguided (especially in the early post-war period), most of them were greedy, stupid and shortsighted, since Keynes could see it was a bad idea even in the 40s.

Now we’re paying, but most of those who set up the system then overbalanced it thru their greed are either dead or still alive and filthy rich, and getting richer.

Life is good if  you’re in the top .01% or so. Really, really good.

And really, you know, to them the problem with mid-century Americans not of the ruling class is they didn’t know their place. Now they’re being taught their place again. No more servant problems.

(My writing helps pay my rent and buys me food. So please consider subscribing or donating if you like my writing.)

Ricardo’s Caveat

By

On September 21, 2021

Comments

Ricardo

Ricardo

In 1817, David Ricardo formalized the Law of Comparative Advantage. Since then, it has stood the test of time as one of the very few laws that an economist can point to and say: “This is indisputably true.” It’s because of this law that you only rarely find an economist who doesn’t believe in unrestricted free trade. But Ricardo added an important caveat when he discussed free trade and comparative advantage, and it’s one that most modern economists seem to have forgotten…

Let’s quote straight from Ricardo:

In one and the same country, profits are, generally speaking, always on the same level; or differ only as the employment of capital may be more or less secure and agreeable. It is not so between different countries. If the profits of capital employed in Yorkshire, should exceed those of capital employed in London, capital would speedily move from London to Yorkshire, and an equality of profits would be effected; but if in consequence of the diminished rate of production in the lands of England, from the increase of capital and population, wages should rise, and profits fall, it would not follow that capital and population would necessarily move from England to Holland, or Spain, or Russia, where profits might be higher.

This is the Achilles heal of comparative advantage — the flaw in the foundation of free trade that causes outsourcing woes. Those who say that the law of comparative advantage proves that free trade is good are absolutely right, but they’ve forgotten his caveat.

Because, in Ricardo’s world, it was true that capital was not particularly mobile. It is not true in our world, and it wasn’t true in the Victorian world.

In a world in which I can move my capital freely between locales, in which I can also move my profits freely, and in which I don’t have to live where my capital is working, there is no reason to invest in any productive activity in my home country if I can make more money elsewhere.

The higher surplus locale is going to get as much free capital as it can soak up and as is available. The logic behind this is simple: Let’s say I have one million dollars to invest, and I can invest it in two different locales. In one place, I’ll get five percent return, in another a ten percent return. In both locales, I can take my profit and do what I want with it. I can live in either locale and, in both places, my money is secure from being seized by the government or destroyed by violence. Obviously, I’m going to put my money into the place with the higher returns.

When I get those profits, I’m going to sink any reinvestment into the place with the higher returns again. It’s a virtuous circle — if you’re the place with the higher returns, and it ends when returns even out or there is no more excess capacity.

If the higher-return country runs out of investment opportunities that pay higher than the low-return country, it makes no sense to invest in it. What matters here is the marginal rate of return — that is, the return on the next dollar of my investment. In principle, there ought to be diminishing returns; people snap up the good opportunities and, over time, the opportunities get worse and worse until returns equalize (this happens faster when currency values are decided independent of government intervention, but it doesn’t always happen — even in the long term, when we’re all dead).

Profit is just how much surplus you’re receiving. Let’s say my workers are capable of producing $5 of goods for every hour they work and my costs are $3/hour for everything (property, taxes, capital costs, and wages). I’m making $2 an hour for every worker I have working for me.

That’s Country A. In Country B, the average worker produces $10 an hour, but my costs are $9, so my surplus is $1. This is half the profit of Country A, even though my workers are more productive.

That’s why US workers are more productive and people are shipping jobs to China and India. Costs in the US are higher for property, wages, and taxation.

To stop capital (and jobs) moving from Country B to Country A, you have to increase surplus. There are two ways to do that: You can reduce costs (most easily by cutting taxes or wages), or you can increase productivity. If the average worker produces one more dollar of goods while costs stays the same, and Country A’s worker’s productivity doesn’t increase, then you’re even.

Or Country A could increase wages, taxation, or property costs and become less competitive.

In a world without mass capital flows, there was another way. You could have lower capital costs. But having the Fed set lower capital costs than another country means little — borrow in the US, invest it where the ROI is higher.

More than that, money you can’t use is, well, useless. Let’s say you’re investing in a factory in China, but you want to live in Europe or the US — and Europe and the US won’t let you use the money you have in China in their countries (or will only let a fraction back in). In this scenario, you’re not likely to invest in China, are you? In addition, money that can’t move is captive to political unrest and other such events, which gives mature, stable countries a big leg up. If moving money is hard or slow, then you’d better be sure that where you have it is stable because if something goes wrong, you can kiss it goodbye.

A key problem right now is demand. Capital flows to low-production-cost/high-surplus domiciles. But there’s only so much demand for goods and only a limited amount of growth in demand for goods. So you’ve got your profits, and you have to figure out what to do with them. You can’t plow all of it back into productive investment, because you’d wind up with more productive capacity than there is ability to buy the goods. As a result, the excess money has to go into nonproductive uses.

The money that does go into productive uses will go to the domiciles that produce the greatest surplus (profit). Many people have pointed out that the US hasn’t lost jobs to outsourcing, that’s only true in a technical sense. What has happened is that the new jobs have been mostly created overseas (in cases where they can be done overseas). Old jobs haven’t been moved (mostly) because of sunk capital costs. Once you’ve paid ten million dollars to create a factory, spending another ten million dollars to relocate the factory usually doesn’t make sense. But if you have to build a new factory anyway (either because you need more capacity or because the old factory would have to be replaced for some reason), then it makes sense to build it in the domicile with the higher surplus production. That’s exactly what we’ve seen over the last few years: China and India getting the new jobs in non-protected sectors. It’s not rocket science, it’s just ROI (Return On Investment).

Because you can’t put all the money back into production, you’ve got to stick some of the money elsewhere. And what we have going is a nice, reinforcing trend. Oldman has called it strip mining the US economy. The money is used to buy your customers’ assets or lent to your customers. In exchange, they put up as collateral either the full faith of their government (we’ll see how good that is in a few years) or their assets, which in the current case means mortgage-backed securities, bonds, and common shares in companies (which represent ownership of assets). They then use that money to buy your goods, and the cycle continues.

This vicious cycle (or virtuous if you’re the one getting rich, and you get out in time) results in excess productive capacity, a slow decline in employment in the low-surplus domicile, and an increase in debt in the low-surplus domicile. It also pushes costs in the low-surplus domicile lower (meaning wages and taxation, primarily).

In the meantime, if the developed world (and specifically the US) were to stop borrowing to buy, the entire engine would collapse. This is not a sustainable development; if the US were to buy only what it could afford, based on its own exports, there would be an economic shockwave — not just in the US, but in China, India, and other high-surplus/low-cost domiciles. And right now, the dynamic is being funded by taking money out of the US and other high-cost domiciles, which must ultimately end in a reduction of demand. If the low-cost domiciles, which have been getting the capital investment, are not capable of soaking up the excess capacity when the US’s consumption comes in line with what the US can afford, then you will have a worldwide recession at the least — and likely a depression.

Economics views systems as moving towards equilibrium. But it’s more useful to view systems as subject to multiple different tendencies. At any given time, different tendencies may be stronger than others. What should be happening is that US costs should drop and developing country costs should rise. It is happening, but it’s not happening very fast. Where these costs meet is going to be somewhere a lot south of the current US standard of living. In the meantime, the dynamic has the US shipping its capital and its growth in productive capacity to lower-cost/higher-surplus domiciles. This will continue until the conditions enabling it end and not before. The conditions which can end it are increased shipping costs (favouring more localized production), the evening out of surplus production, a political decision to discourage either trade or capital flows, or an unwillingness or inability of either the US to borrow or its creditors to lend (the end of the housing bubble strikes directly at this). Until then, capital will go to the higher returns, and since the highest returns on production are mostly not in the US, capital that creates production jobs will flow disproportionately away from the US while asset bubbles form in the United States in order to pay for imports. (And the assets they have bought, or allowed the US to borrow against, are likely to crash in the final days of this system. A suckers’ game all around, but the only thing worse than playing is trying to stop playing.)

(Originally published years ago at BOP news, I put it back up here because this is what is at the heart of problems with globalization and why comparative advantage no longer works. April 25, 2015 — and back to the top again, in honor of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement. Sept 2021, and again, twice a decade seems appropriate.)

If you enjoyed this article, and want me to write more, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

The New Age Of Vertical Integration

By

On August 9, 2021

Comments

When I was very young, conglomerates which controlled the entire chain of production were still somewhat popular. Companies didn’t like outsourcing or offshoring; if a widget went into their product, they wanted to own the factory, or eat least effectively control the supplier. Toyota had lots of suppliers, sure, but they were close the factories and they were under Toyota’s thumb: subsidiaries in all but name.

But business fashion changes, and the mantra of the day became “concentrate only on core business, get an expert to do everything else.” It often did reduce costs, but at the price of losing control. It didn’t work for everyone, General Electric under the over-praised but actually incompetent Jack Welch gutted itself. Following GE’s lead, other companies like the Big 3 auto producers started thinking they were financial companies and in the business of making money, not products.

Didn’t work out well for those who followed the fad whose business model didn’t actually support it.

But it did work well for many, at least in terms of increasing CEO and executive stock compensation. Growth actually slowed in the economy overall, but the economy in neoliberalism exists for companies, not companies for the economy, let alone society.

This era is now ending. Climate change is here, and infrastructure in foolish countries like America is failing repeatedly. China and the US are gearing up for a Cold War, Covid revealed that world shipping is fragile and not always cheap, and that no one can actually understand modern supply chains.

Supply officers panicked and started stockpiling goods, putting further pressure on supply chains and driving up prices for both shipping and materials, BUT if we didn’t have an era where trade and shipping and even production will become more and more subject to shocks, it would just be a passing fad.

But smart CEOS will now be reeling in their supply chains: rationalizing them so they know exactly where all the parts are made; the parts are made close to where they are assembled (if not in the same plant complex) and insulating them from problems with  3rd party shippers. The smart ones will pursue both vertical integration AND will have some geographic distribution (but not too much) so that geographical problems (wildfires, marine inundations, hurricanes, food riots) don’t shut them down entirely.

Those who don’t stand to lose their business entirely if a shock takes out a key part of their supply chain they don’t control or understand, or which supplies generally and is not bound to them.

We’ve been thru a very stupid era, and it’s not over yet, but it’s ending. Central banks can print money, but they can’t print machines parts, oil or food, and the limits of their power to deal with actual, real, non-financial shocks to the system are about to become evident.

Indeed, central banks, by funneling money to rich people and corporations which would have otherwise gone bankrupt have done almost everything within their power to make the system more fragile and worse run.l

When the food riots hit your country, remember to pay a visit to the central bank officers, past and present, to see how they are doing and to express your appreciation for their service. Perhaps you could also see the welfare of neoliberal politicians.

(Accurate job feedback has been removed from our elites, and they need it badly. When you have the chance, remember to help them out by providing it.)

Midas was a fool, but electronic bits are even more worthless than gold when the real world comes knocking.

(My writing helps pay my rent and buys me food. So please consider subscribing or donating if you like my writing.)

The Canadian Economy Under US Hegemony and Neoliberalism

By

On July 19, 2021

Comments

Canada’s economy is substantially resource based: minerals, wood, agriculture, and, before the collapse, fish. (The Maritimes were originally colonized largely to harvest trees for masts, which Britain had run out of at home.)

Resource economies are boom and bust economies; resource prices are cyclical, and sometimes resources get replaced. Brazil had a huge rubber plantation industry at one point, before chemists figured out how to make synthetic rubber.

Resource economies tend towards corruption because the profits are so high during good times, and they tend to not develop industry for the same reason, but also because the currency rate tends to be too high to  allow exports of manufactured goods during boom periods — so any industry gets destroyed during the boom.

For about a hundred years, Canada had a simple solution to these problems. We had a manufacturing sector, and during boom resource times, when the Canadian dollar’s strength made manufactured goods too expensive, we just subsidized the manufacturing and slapped on tariffs.

This was a fair deal, because when resource prices went bust and the dollar went low, manufacturing would boom and the taxes from that would be used to support people who worked in resource extraction.

Combined with some simple industrial policy along the lines of “don’t export raw logs or raw fish,” this created a nicely self-balancing economy, and it did so from about 1880 until the 1980s.

Neoliberalism and idiotic trade deals like NAFTA and the WTO put paid to that. It became very difficult to subsidize industries or to insist that processing be done in Canada; we started shipping raw logs and fish to the US, and we stopped subsidizing manufacturing during resource booms, so Canadian manufacturing got gutted.

This was, well, stupid, and a lot of blame is on Canada, Canadians, and the Canadian system, though, to be fair, most Canadians voted for parties opposed to the Free Trade Agreement (which later became NAFTA), but because of vote splitting in a third-party first past the post system, it went through anyway.

But it’s also because the US is, well, powerful. Canada’s economy is a little smaller than California’s, and Canada is a satrapy. Back in the 50s, Canada had a world-leading aviation industry and created the best fighter jet in the world: the Avro Arrow. The US government put on the pressure, and Avro (the company) was put out of business. The prototypes were sunk in a lake.

The threat was that if Canada didn’t give up its aviation industry, the US would take away auto manufacturing, and that was a much larger industry.

If the US wants Canada to do something, Canada generally does it. There have been exceptions, especially under Pierre Trudeau in the 70s, and in the early 2000s Prime Minister Chretien did refuse to invade Iraq, but they are exceptions.

Anyway, Canada’s economy is now much more fragile than it used to be, because it’s much more integrated into the world economy and much less able to adjust cyclically or insist on keeping a significant manufacturing sector.

This isn’t unique, or anything. It’s the shape of the world economy overall, where countries, especially under neoliberalism, mostly aren’t allowed to have an independent economic policy. Canada was never autarchic; we were always a trading state, but we were able to more or less run our own affairs and insist that resources mined, chopped, or fished here be at least primarily processed here.

Nations which do not make what they need are at the mercy of those who do. The US got around this by maintaining control of making, growing, and digging things without keeping them in the US, until they made the mistake of letting China industrialize.

That has lead to the rise of China/US tensions, and a realization that neoliberalism is a two-edged sword.

More on that later. In the meantime, the reason most of the world’s nations are poor and have to do what the US wants when push comes to shove, is exactly because they were not, and are not, allowed separate industrial and economic policies.

Canada, the near neighbour and satrapy, actually still has a pretty good deal, better, in fact, than is given to American peasants.

But all of that will be changing over the next couple decades.

(My writing helps pay my rent and buys me food. So please consider subscribing or donating if you like my writing.)

Offshoring Critical Industries Is So Harmful It Should Be Treason (Covid Edition)

By

On March 25, 2021

Comments

I was impressed how fast the UK and the US were vaccinating their population. How were they doing it, after they had been so incompetent during the rest of the pandemic?

Simple enough. Restrictions on vaccine exports.

Meanwhile:

India delays big exports of AstraZeneca shot, including to COVAX, as infections surge

And then there’s this:

(Spare me the self-serving arguments that breaking the patents wouldn’t have helped because it takes too much time to ramp up production. However long it takes, the sooner  your open up the IP, the faster it happens.)

And we could make it happen faster:

But the global capacity for producing vaccines is about a third of what is needed, says Ellen t’Hoen, an expert in medicines policy and intellectual property law.

….

To make a vaccine you not only need to have the right to produce the actual substance they are composed of (which is protected by patents), you also need to have the knowledge about how to make them because the technology can be complex.

The WHO does not have the authority to sidestep patents – but it is trying to bring countries together to find a way to bolster vaccine supplies.

The discussions include using provisions in international law to get around patents and helping countries to have the technical ability to make them.

Rich countries use IP law to keep poor countries poor, and to kill and impoverish their citizens to make even larger profits.

And, of course, if you’re stupid enough to believe neoliberal bullshit about how your countries will be OK and don’t take steps even though you have manufacturing capacity, (Europe), well, your citizens die. The EU is now restricting imports to the UK. I wonder how many Europeans will die because of not having those 10 million doses?

“I mention specifically the U.K.,” said EU Commission Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis. Since the end of January, “some 10 million doses have been exported from the EU to the U.K. and zero doses have been exported from U.K. to the EU.”

OK. I have said this for years and years but I’m going to say it again now that it is being illustrated brutally: if you can’t make it yourself, you can’t be sure you’ll have it when you need it, since countries that can make it will tend to prioritize themselves.

You must make and grow everything essential to your country domestically if you can. Any international laws that forbid you from doing so are illegitimate. They may exist; they are not Just. This doesn’t mean completely breaking patent law (though it needs to be much less draconian and a lot less long), it does mean, at the least, writing in mandatory licensing provisions at reasonable prices.

A lot of people are going to die who didn’t need to because neoliberal “free trade” orthodoxy said you didn’t need to be able to both design and make vaccines in your own country: the “market” would supply you.

Eventually.

This isn’t just about behaviour now. It is about behaviour that has been encoded into law and trade practice over decades.

Don’t offshore anything that matters. If your citizens have to pay 5% or 10% more, slap on tariffs.

To not do so, if you think the welfare of your citizens is your duty, is treason.

All the content here is free, but subscriptions and donations do help, a lot.

You Can’t Buy Anything That Matters When It Matters (Covid Vaccine Edition)

By

On December 12, 2020

Comments

… unless you have control over the production facilities.


I think this map is a little inaccurate, but it makes the point. Money matters, yes, but having control over vaccine manufacturers and R&D matters more.

This is true of everything. Oil is not a global market if there are ever shortages decision makers care about. FOOD is not a global market if there’s ever a worldwide shortage, and countries which net import will find that out. (The Irish famine, where Ireland, then an imperial colony, continued to export food even as its people starved, underlines the word control.)

Global markets are OK for things that don’t matter. For anything that does matter you want manufacture, R&D and supply lines concentrated in your own country or that of true close allies. In those cases, you want mutual vulnerability. If country A has it all and is a close ally, that won’t work when they’re desperate, you have to have part of the dependencies.

Even this doesn’t work completely. It was very popular before WWI to state that a big European war couldn’t happen because of how interdependent the economies were.

Yeah.

 

(It’s my annual fundraiser (and has been lower this year, for obvious reasons) If you value my writing and can afford to, please consider subscribing or donating.)

It does help.

 

Industrial policy means that if you can, you make it at home, and if it costs a little extra, too bad, slap on a tariff. If you control natural resources, you NEVER sell them raw if you have any choice. The history of England’s economic development leading to the Industrial revolution starts with a ban on selling English wool to mainland Europe, allowing them to build their own textiles industry. Of course, those textiles were worse than what Flemish weavers would have made, and less efficient to start, with higher prices. The English, correctly, did not care. They had the wool, and there wasn’t a huge surplus of wool. Buy the clothes from us or no one.

Food, water and essential goods: if it is at all possible you want to be self sufficient in all three. In sensible countries a great deal of geopolitics is driven by this when a country can’t do it all internally. China knows, for example, that the US can shut down the Strait of Malacca any time it wants, crushing their oil supply and that is a major reason why they are creating a huge land route all the way across the Asian continent, and getting snuggly with the Russians (who can supply oil by land.)

Chinese economic policy, letting Westerners get super rich by producing goods in China, was also driven by this. The Americans aren’t wrong, the Chinese were super-aggressive about technology transfer. The deal was often that in order to get access, you had to give them the tech. If you wouldn’t, they would try and steal it (Americans stole a ton of British IP back in the day, don’t get all pious, everyone does it.) There was also technology-arm breaking creep. Sure, you gave us a tech a few years ago, but what have you given us recently, and why should we allow you to stay in our market today?

Foolish nations, like Canada and the US, let key industries go overseas, or sell raw materials without processing. Wise countries don’t, unless they’re getting something very worth it in return. Getting a bunch of new rich people who made their money by selling your country out isn’t “worth it” to anyone but the rich people and the politicians they bribed.

Money doesn’t cut it. Per capita Canada bought more Covid vaccines than anyone else, but notice that Canadians won’t be in the first wave to get mass vaccination. This is a “white, 1st world” country, and it can’t buy its way in. (The case is a bit more complicated than that, because the government are incompetent, but we’ll leave it there for now.)

If it isn’t on your territory, where your people with guns and your bureaucrats have power, you don’t control it and when it matters, you can’t buy it.

SUBSCRIBE OR DONATE

Cold War 2.0 Incoming

By

On August 11, 2020

Comments

Right, with the ban on Huawei using chips made with American manufacturing equipment (one of the US’s last few places of absolute advantage), the bans on TikTok, Tencent, and WeChat, the attempt to convince other countries to not use Huawei 5G, and the arrest of the Huawei founder’s daughter for doing business with Iran, along with the US seizing a freighter full of medical supplies for Iran, I think we can state that the world is moving towards a second cold war.

The US pivoted to China containment under Obama, not Trump — though Trump has been far more aggressive. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was created as a way of marshaling Asia-Pacific countries into an anti-Chinese trade area. While Trump didn’t go ahead with it, he’s pushed hard against China in other ways.

When the US asked Canada to seize the daughter of Huawei’s founder, for example, it destroyed Canada-China relations: Canada was forced to take sides, and the Chinese were furious. The USMC (the NAFTA replacement) included a clause that says signees cannot make new trade deals with non-free states if the others object: This was aimed squarely at China.

Britain had originally intended to use Huawei 5G, but after leaving the EU, reversed course.

It’s important to understand that the anti-China pivot is bipartisan, as are the sanctions against Huawei and others.

The United States has a number of advantages and it’s using all of them aggressively. First, the fact that it is the center of the financial universe, to the point that movement of funds often goes through the US even when the transaction doesn’t involve them, is a major one. The US has made its financial laws extra-territorial, in effect. If a transaction goes through the US at all, even if no one involved in the transaction is American-related, the US claims jurisdiction. (Famously, this was used by the US to launch an investigation in the World Cup, in which the US is a trivial player, because a bribe went through the US on its way somewhere else.)

This often happens unintentionally, and firms that do business with the US at all are thus often unwilling to do business with anyone whom the US has sanctioned.

US naval power and military presence is also important, with their ability to interdict the Strait of Malacca. China imports about 70 percent of their oil, and 80 percent goes thru the Malacca strait and the US can shut it down any time they want. This is true of much else that China imports or exports.

The Belt and Road Initiative is, in part, meant to cut out the US ability to use its navy to hurt China; it creates alternate land routes, including one right across the continent to Europe, and it includes pipelines. The alliance with Russia, fraught as it is, is also about reducing dependence on Malacca.

Indeed, even the ability to protect and control trade to nearby neighbours is in doubt, which is why China built artificial islands in the South China Sea.

Fundamentally, the post-WWII trade, financial, and military order is an American creation, with a European assist.

When the US let China into the WTO, they let the power most likely to overtake them inside, as it were, the house. They did so for the simplest of all reasons: greed. Oh, sure, there was talk of capitalism meaning democracy and all that, but basically, offshoring and outsourcing to China made a lot of money for a lot of corporations and rich people, and that’s why they allowed China in.

The US deliberately sped up the transfer of industry to China as a way of making more money and undercutting wages at home. China knew the deal it was offering; they understood Americans, and they were patient.

So now, China is a larger manufacturing country than the US and, by some measures, has a larger economy.

China is a threat.

China is seen as a threat and this perception is, again, bipartisan.

There is no reason to expect this to change. China is not going to buckle under to the US, like some third-world nation or a vassal like Canada. They now have a de-facto alliance with Russia. China has nuclear weapons, and Russia is not going to allow China to be taken out with a nuclear first strike (without China, they’d have to give the US anything it wants, and they know it.)

The US will keep using its financial and technological power to weaken and isolate China.

So what will happen is an acceleration of the creation of a banking system that routes entirely around the United States and which does not use the US dollar, but instead the Yuan. Countries will be folded into this, as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Even core US allies may have little choice: South Korea does twice as much business with China as with the US, for example, and Australia is extremely dependent on China.

For many countries, China clearly offers the better deal: they provide far more cheap loans than the US, they provide development, and their goods and services are suitable for both developed and developing nations. Nor do they natter on about “human rights” while they bomb Yemen.

For others, China will be unacceptable.

This leads to a world with two trade areas, not a free trade world. It leads to an end of the dollar as the world reserve currency. It leads to a continued arms race. It may well lead to a breaking of world IP into two sets: one American lead, one China lead. (There’s no particular reason for China to respect US IP if the US refuses to let them use it.)

This is a recipe for Cold War 2.0.

This time, however, understand that the US is facing an “enemy” with more population and more industry than it, not a nation devastated by World War with less population. Likewise, China and Russia combined have more land and more resources, while Europe is not a sure American ally, though Britain, absent EU support, will fall completely into US vassal status.

This is especially true as the US is experiencing late-imperial rot. It is nearly completely unable to handle its internal affairs, and its social cohesion is breaking down to the point where it may soon become a failed state.

Many American supporters of Cold War 2.0 are trying to use China as the external enemy to rally Americans around and, by closing China off from the US, to drive manufacturing back to the US, or at least to its firm allies (like Taiwan).

Bringing manufacturing back is smart, it should never have been sent overseas, but American elites are confused: Their primary enemy isn’t China, their primary enemy is themselves. They are responsible for the US decline and China could not have risen so fast if they were not so corrupt, greedy, and short-sighted.

It’s a very stupid world we’re moving into, but some of what is going to happen has to happen. It’s not good that the US has the ability to sanction anyone it wants to. Those medical supplies seized off that freighter? Covid-19 medicines.

Power which is routinely abused, as the US has abused its financial and military power, is eventually removed. The US is accelerating this progress as fast as it can.

The ban on Huawei using chips manufactured with US tech will hurt, for example. But it’s time limited: China isn’t some backwards third-world country. They will advance their own chip manufacturing and erase the deficit.

By fighting the dragon, the US is making a rival an enemy.

Cold War 2.0 is coming and essentially inevitable, because it is something the leadership of both countries either wants or is willing to accept. The only monkey wrench in this are the effects of climate change and ecological collapse. More on them later.

Everything I write here is free, but rent isn’t, so if you value my writing, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

Page 6 of 13

Previous

Next

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén