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The Technology of Violence and its effect on prosperity and freedom

Picture of a Greek Phalanx

A Greek Phalanx

 

Prosperity is two things:

1) How much you can produce with your technology and social organization;

2) Who gets how much.

 

The second is determined by a number of factors, but the simplest is the structure of violence.  Those who aren’t good at fighting, don’t get as much of the surplus created by society as those who are.  Who is good at violence is determined to a remarkable extent by the interaction between the technology of violence, geography and the everyday life of different classes of society.

It has long been noted that in polities where warfare requires a large, organized chunk of the population, more widespread affluence and democracy are more common.

So we have Athenian Greece, where free males fought either as infantry or in the fleets, and where the franchise extended to those who fought.  We have Republican Rome, whose legions were originally raised from the citizenry, and which became an Empire when the armies were no longer raised primarily from those close to the city of Rome and when soldiers became more loyal to their generals than to the state.  We have the Swiss Cantons, where men fought as close order pikemen and were free, while most of the rest of Europe was ruled by mounted nobles and most ordinary people were serfs.  And we have the age of conscript armies in the 19th and 20th centuries, also coincident with a vast increase in democracy and prosperity.

Note that in many of these cases democratic rights extended almost exactly to the fighting class.  Women in Switzerland received the vote later than in most of the European subcontinent.  Athenian women were infamous for the lack of rights, and the same is true of Republican Rome at its height: the society which defined patriarchy.  In Rome there was a separate, higher class, the Eques (Equestrians) based on having enough money to afford to fight on horseback.

All of these places were well known for their prosperity in the heyday of their use of citizen armies.  Men too poor to take care of themselves properly (by which we mean eat a nutritious diet) make poor soldiers, and just as poor rowers in a galley navy.  There were always rich, and Republican Rome can be understood as partially oligarchical and partially an aristocratic oligarchy depending on what time period you’re looking at, but still, Romans were free, had access to relatively reliable law, and were prosperous.

When they stopped being prosperous as a group, when inequality soared, the Republic went through a series of convulsions (recognized as class wars even at the time), and eventually ended in rule by an Emperor.

The relationship between fighting as infantry, even close order infantry, and prosperity and democracy is not a sure thing.  Many of the Greek Polis were not democracies and had frightful inequality, Sparta most famously.  Rome fought using close order infantry well into the period of the Emperors, and so on.

Nonetheless, if the method of warfare involves men who must cooperate together and trust each other implicitly, they are much more likely to be free, prosperous, or both.  Saxon and Norse England, before the arrival of the Normans is a place where ordinary people have far more rights than the Normans (a Norse offshoot) allow (in part because of Norman forts, meaning that local revolts can rarely succeed, and in which a small number of men can hold off a vastly largely number.  It is largely because of forts that Wales, for example, is permanently subdued.)  The wealth is also much more evenly spread in pre-Norman England.  English history books often start with the Norman conquest, it should be understood that, overall, that conquest was a disaster for the inhabitants of England.

The price of armaments is one of the key factors in prosperity and democracy. If a group of individuals is effective and can win using cheap armaments over those using expensive armaments, again, expect more widespread prosperity and greater rights for the poor.  The cutoff point for effective armaments if the cutoff point for widespread prosperity in most cases.  If a rifle with a bayonet is all someone needs to be effective, expect the franchise to spread.  If it does not spread, expect the first nation to spread it, to be wildly successful on the battlefield: the French revolution is the paradigmatic case.

Of course reactionary regimes can conscript too, but Germans in the late 19th century are more prosperous, even the poor, than those before widespread conscription.

If, on the other hand, effective warfare requires significant wealth, as with Medieval knights, who require a multitude of serfs to support even one fighter, well, expect that those who aren’t good at fighting won’t be prosperous.  People today don’t realize how many peasant revolts there were.  What is instructive about them is the slaughter involved: the slaughter of serfs and peasants. Often huge rebellions would be put down with only a handful of casualties.  Knights were very good at killing peasants armed with makeshift weapons.

If you can kill them and they can’t do anything about it, how much of what they produce is really theirs?

How armaments are made also matters. Even cheap weapons, if they must be made in centralized factories and cannot be made by individuals and small groups, will not be as useful to widespread prosperity as otherwise.  The Jeffersonian style yeoman farmer society takes a serious blow in the war of 1812, when it becomes clear that the British centralized manufacture of weapons is more effective than making weapons locally.

The technology of violence interacts with the terrain. Note that in three of these cases we are talking about societies which were born in hilly terrain.  Greece, Rome and Switzerland are not flat land.  Cavalry is far less effective.  Cities have mobs that are effective, even communes, in the Middle Ages, because of how they are laid out.  Not only is cavalry useless inside a city, but the narrow streets mean that men can only fight one or two abroad, so even organized infantry has very little advantage in a city.  The great broad boulevards of Paris, the wide streets of other cities were created first not for the convenience of the citizens, but so that they could easily be killed in large numbers if they revolted.  Medieval cities were free in part because they were very hard to conquer: fortifications, enough money to equip soldiers and streets in which a knight could easily be hauled from his horse and have a knife shoved into the eye-holes of his helmet.  And, of course, cities paid a great deal of money for the privilege of being free, often directly either to the king or the equivalent of a Duke; thus putting them under the protection of the most powerful noble in the realm.

Terrain where cavalry can operate freely; where infantry can be bypassed, tends to either be ruled by states or, historically, by nomads, depending on whether it is good for growing crops or for pasture.

Nomads and barbarians, but especially horse nomads, should also be discussed.  Much of history can be viewed as a cycle of Agrarian civilizations expanding, being conquered by barbarians or nomads, expanding till they have no surplus due to administrative overload, then being conquered by barbarians or nomads again.

From a population point of view, this is absurd.  The Manchu, when the conquered China, probably had 1 to 2% of the population of China.  The Mongols were a miniscule fraction of the population of the territories they conquered.  But Barbarians have something going for them; every fighting age male who isn’t a thrall or slave is a warrior, and often a very good one.  It has long been noted that healthy rural or wilderness people make the best soldiers: Roman recruiters wanted the sons of free farmers.  Canadian and Australian soldiers in WWI were far better than English soldiers because they grew up on the farm, well fed as a rule, and shooting a gun.

Unfree or other impoverished rural types are generally not much use in a fight.  If they didn’t have proper nutrition as children, they’re worthless.  But free rural males are tough, and in a culture where they use weapons, already skilled, generally to a level no “basic training” for conscripts can possibly reach.  All basic training teaches such people is how to fight as a disciplined group: the weapon skills are already there.

The Mongols hunted in large, indeed army sized groups, driving the prey before them.  They were expert horsemen, master archers using one of the best bows in the world, and they were used to working in organized groups.  The Mongols, it is said, hunted like it was war, and made war like it was a hunt.

The specific technology they used was also perfect in an important sense: horse archers choose their battles against slower armies, and can withdraw effectively taking few losses. If the Mongols didn’t want to fight, they didn’t.  They only fought, during their heyday, when they had the advantage and as a result they racked up victory after victory.

The everyday structure of Mongol life thus provided most of what they needed to be extraordinarily effective soldiers: it took only uniting them and making some strategic and tactical doctrine changes to turn them into a force that conquered the largest land empire in history, and allowed them to conquer nations which were far, far more populous than they.  Note, again, however, the interaction of terrain and technology: the Mongols’ initial conquests were generally in relatively flat lands.  (Though not exclusively. Genghis Khan was the last person to really crush the Afghans, after all.)

So we have our trifecta: the Mongols had excellent technology (bows, horses and stirrup); the terrain was suited to their style of warfare; and their way of life made them tough and taught them almost all the skills necessary to be effective soldiers.

BOOM.  World Conquest.

Another major factor might be called “not worth conquering”, or (related, but not identical) “area denial”.

This is an important consideration in today’s world.  The Coalition attack on Afghanistan was all very fine and good, and they easily conquered the cities, but they couldn’t control the countryside.  Guerrilla warfare, to be sure, has been used for millennia (the Romans fought a nasty guerrilla war in Spain.)  But modern technology, specifically explosives in the form of mines and their easily made irregular counterpart the IED, make it easy to do area denial.  NATO troops in Afghanistan and Iraq had their mobility and their ability to control the country severely curtailed: they couldn’t drive their vehicles down most roads without risk.

The Taliban and the Iraqi freedom fighters thus could not defeat the US army in open field battle, as a rule, but they could bleed them and deny them the fruits of conquest.   Much of Afghanistan could not be effectively taxed by the puppet government in Kabul; the same was true in Iraq.  In the end, in Iraq, the US military had to pay militias in order to be allowed to withdraw.

This, then, is the question of how effective irregular warfare is.  How much loss can under-equipped troops inflict?  An American infantryman is expensive; an American tank is more expensive. An American helicopter pilot is precious.  An insurgent with an grenade launcher is not.  Your expensive troops may inflict higher casualties on the enemy, but they are more expensive and harder to replace.

If the Chinese had been able to reliably inflict one loss on the Mongols per five Chinese losses, they would have won, at least in the early part of the war.

For much of history many areas were simply not worth conquering: the natives were dangerous and had no wealth that anyone else wanted.  The fall of the British Empire can be viewed in part as “why are you conquering huge chunks of the world that offer nothing worth the cost of subduing and then administering them?”

The more the locals can resist; the more they can have a good life without creating portable wealth; and the more they are lucky not to be sitting on gold, silver, or oil, the more likely they are to be left to their own affairs.  If the wealth of a nation is its people, profiting from its conquest is tricky: if its wealth is a resource that a few people can extract, profiting from conquest is easy.

Being conquered, some exceptions aside, is rarely good for those conquered. India before the Mughals and the British was one of the most prosperous areas in the world.  Afterwards it was known for its poverty.  India had more manufacturing ability than the British before the British started conquering it, for example.  And British India had frequent famines, while independent India does not.

For those involved, this can be a lose/lose proposition: Iraq has been devastated. Afghanistan has been devastated.  Some Americans definitely got rich (mostly by stealing from the American government through vast corruption); but both societies lost.  Nonetheless, those who will not resist, gain only and exactly what those who win will allow them to have.  Republican Romans were not taxed.  Their conquests were.

The effectiveness of personal violence also matters.  The concealed dagger, the concealed revolver, make assassination possible, even easy.  They restrict the mobility of those who oppress. It is not accidental that Nixon, who is President when American inequality is still low and world inequality is declining, goes to see protestors at night with only one aide, and no bodyguards, while Clinton, Bush or Obama would never consider such a thing and Washington DC is disfigured by huge concrete barriers; constant weapon checks and so on.

The more ruling requires the rulers to actually be amongst the ruled, the more the effectiveness of personal weapons matter. Obama can rule behind a cordon of guards; rulers who need to be in contact with the people cannot.

Finally we come to the balance of terror.  Weapons that devastate are weapons of terror.  Aerial bombardment is about terror, drones with hellfire missiles are about terror.  “We can kill you, and we can destroy your infrastructure, and there is nothing you can do to stop us.”

Terror begets terror.  Those who are terrorized (and bombing is a terror weapon, let no one tell you otherwise) begets attempts to retaliate.

Terror is remarkably ineffective against non-elite societies until it scales.  If you can destroy entire populations, your terror will work.  If everyone fears your kidnap and torture squads; it may work.  But it doesn’t win actual wars: even World War II strategic bombing was found to be largely ineffective at stopping German production, what it was good at was killing large numbers of civilians.

What terror is good at is dealing with out of touch enemy elites.  If you can swoop in, kill the elites, and they cannot stop you, they are more likely to give you what you want without ever having to fight.  This is also what conventional military supremacy is good for.  Imagine the following scenario: George Bush invades Iraq, publishes a proscription list, and elevates a competent Colonel to be the new leader of Iraq and leaves within 6 months.

That would send a message to elites with ineffective conventional armies all through the world: “we can kill you, personally.”

It does not work against highly motivated ideological organizations.  Killing the man in the Taliban more times than I can remember has not stopped the Taliban.  Vast waves of assassination throughout large parts of the Muslim world have not stopped the rise of al-Qaeda affiliates or similar organizations.  Terror works against people who have something left to lose, or who value their life more than anything else.  Against those who are willing to die for their beliefs and who lead an organization or society which agrees with them, it matters little: they will be replaced and their replacement is just as likely to be more competent than less.

But if your elites fear for their lives and do not have strong beliefs they are willing to die for your society will be run, in effect, by the foreign nation which they fear, and while your elites will probably do well enough from bribes, ordinary people will not.

From the point of view of those with an advantage in terror, then, it is best used either as wholesale slaughter, or as very occasional examples. Once people have nothing to lose; or once you have radicalized them, it is almost completely ineffective, and can even be counterproductive, with each new atrocity simply making the masses more determined to resist.

If terror is your weapon, use it sparingly, or make sure your enemies’ ability to resist in destroyed utterly.

Wars of terror are devastating to prosperity.  Waves of torture; mass bombing campaigns; serial assassination, destroy either the infrastructure of society or the cohesion and trust required for prosperity. If one side feels it can destroy the other with impunity, you wind up with Gaza.

Those who want prosperity must be able to retaliate effectively. If you can be fined millions for “stealing” a few dozen songs; if you can be jailed for, in effect, going bankrupt (the case in America today); if the police can easily defeat the masses; then those who control government and thus control the police can and will take as much of the surplus of society as they want.  Those who doubt this proposition are invited to note that the top 10% of society (really the top 3% or so) in America are now taking more than the entire gains of the recovery while America has created a paramilitary police; and an unprecedented in American history surveillance network and has put in prison the largest % of its population in history.  These three facts are not unrelated.

Concluding Remarks

There are many in the world today who want to change technology to make the world a better place.  If they are concerned with prosperity for the masses let me suggest to them this: cheap weapons that make groups of men and women effective fighters; which require them to trust together and work in groups; are in the long run likely to lead to prosperity.  Nor can this empowerment be in area denial alone. IEDs are great at ensuring the writ of the government cannot extend to an area: but they destroy prosperity.  Technologies like drones (and effective ground combat robots are about 10 years out), will do the opposite.

By itself technologies that empower organized groups are insufficient.  But they are virtually a requirement for widespread prosperity. Without them those who have the advantage in violence will use it to take what they can, and those who cannot resist will live in the conditions their superiors allow.

(Update: reference to droit du seigneur removed.)


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The First Real Russian Retaliation for American Sanctions

It starts:

Rosneft has recently signed a series of big contracts for oil exports to China and is close to signing a “jumbo deal” with Indian companies. In both deals, there are no US dollars involved. Reuters reports, that Russia is close to entering a goods-for-oil swap transaction with Iran that will give Rosneft around 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil per day to sell in the global market. The White House and the russophobes in the Senate are livid and are trying to block the transaction because it opens up some very serious and nasty scenarios for the petrodollar. If Sechin decides to sell this Iranian oil for rubles, through a Russian exchange, such move will boost the chances of the “petroruble” and will hurt the petrodollar.

It can be said that the US sanctions have opened a Pandora’s box of troubles for the American currency. The Russian retaliation will surely be unpleasant for Washington, but what happens if other oil producers and consumers decide to follow the example set by Russia? During the last month, China opened two centers to process yuan-denominated trade flows, one in London and one in Frankfurt. Are the Chinese preparing a similar move against the greenback? We’ll soon find out.

The US has, to use the phrase du jour, a great deal of “privilege” because the US dollar is the standard unit of trade, most significantly, trade in oil.  If you get frozen out of the dollar, you get frozen out of a large part of the world economy.  American sanctions can virtually destroy a country, as banks, even non-American banks, won’t do business with a country the Treasury department has forbidden doing business with.

Breaking that—moving to a multilateral world, or to a world where trading in Yuan is just as acceptable, goes a long way to breaking American power. In general, the Europeans will follow the US lead, so moving to the Euro provides no protection from America.  But moving to the Yuan and the Ruble, does.  Pricing large oil transaction in rubles also helps protect the Russian currency from large moves: if the ruble drops too much, people will go into it if you can buy oil in rubles, and the Russians are opening a futures operation as well, meaning traders can make that play, even if the US doesn’t like it.

Of course, the US could go harder in sanctions, making it difficult to take those winnings and get them back into dollars or Euros, but if the trade is large enough, Chinese and Oilarchy banks will clean the money and hide the flows.  London and New York will then want to get in on it, and will, through their offshore subsidiaries in various banking havens.

Note also the poke in the eye: the deal to take Iranian oil and sell it as Russian oil, bypassing the sanctions against Iran.

All of this is far more harmful to America’s real interests than any sanction the US has so far imposed on Russia.


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Economic Theories are Prescriptive, not Descriptive

One of the advantages of studying anthropology, sociology and archeology is that you know that while there’s probably such a thing as “human nature”  it has a vast range of expression.  Some societies are cooperative, sharing and kind, with virtually no hierarchy.  Others are hierarchical, cruel, domineering and full of people who ruthlessly compete with each other, and screw the hindmost.  And still others are in-between, with a vast spectrum of possibilities.

These societies have different ways of distributing goods.  In many hunter-gatherer societies, for example, they decide who gets the animal killed by looking at whose arrow killed it.  Seems very “screw the hindmost” until you find out that the hunters freely share the arrows they make.  The arrow that killed the animal probably didn’t come from the person who made the arrow.  And, in any case, they share much of the kill.

Every economic system, every way of distributing goods and services, requires a different ethic and it elevates a different ethic.  While merchants might have been wealthy, in many agricultural societies, including China and Japan through much of their history, they were considered parasites: they created nothing, after all.  Peasants might be poorer, but they were given higher status, including legally, than merchants.  In the European Middle Ages money made from trade was considered dirty, and strictly speaking, if a noble engaged in mercantile activities or took up a trade, they would lose their noble status.  Perhaps this honored more often in the breach, but history is full of nobles who did lose their status through working with their hands, or engaging in trade too openly.  (This was also true of Roman Patricians, by the way.)  Honorable wealth came from land, war or gifts from other nobles for service.

Modern economics is famous for believing in the rational economic actor, almost entirely concerned with his or her own utility.  (In normal parlance, a selfish bastard).  This is a model of how people behave, but it’s an oversimplification of human nature so severe as to be wrong.  Most people don’t behave like that most of the time: they cooperate, and they share and most of them don’t free ride.

There is an exception, however: economics students.  Multiple studies have found that economics students act as economic theory would predict far more than people not trained in economics.

Economics is, thus, prescriptive.  It tells people how they should behave.

Who else behaves that way?  Senior executives in large corporations and rich people.  The people who control the economy, act as economic theory says they should.

Be clear, all elites in all places and times have not acted this way: chieftains in status societies do not act like this. Potlach giving native Americans did not act this way.  The elders of hunter-gatherer tribes do not act this way.  Roman Patricians, Chinese Mandarins, and Medieval European nobles did not act this way—at least, not nearly as much as our modern economic leaders do.

It is not even the case that executives in the 50s and 60s acted this way.  When John Kenneth Galbraith investigated why executives back then didn’t pay themselves more, he came to the conclusion that they didn’t because they believed, as a group, that doing so would be wrong, and they took out anyone who tried to pay themselves more than they considered appropriate.

So why do executives act that way now?

Ideas lead culture and policy produces the outcomes one would expect.  Thatcher and Reagan and intellectuals like Dawkins made being greed and taking whatever you could get, screw the hindmost, acceptable.  “Greed was good” in the 80s, and has become better since.  We were told this is how humans are; and this is how humans should be; and that doing this would produce better outcomes for everyone.  This was legislated into law: the removal of protections from financial abuse put in place in the 30s, the lowering of top tax rates; the emphasis on consumption taxes over wealth taxes, the dropping of corporate tax rates; the “free trade” movement which allowed elites to avoid taxes and make goods in sweatshop nations.

The previous generation, those who experienced the Great Depression as adults, and who remembered the 20s and what the last great unregulated economy had wrought, were old, and out of power.  Those who believed; who knew; that economic success had nothing to do with any sort of virtue, were gone.  The new generations accepted a premise they desperately wanted to believe: that they could be selfish assholes, acting in their own interest and not caring about other people, and that it would all work out for the best.

This was twofold: it was the result of a concerted intellectual effort by people like Dawkins and Milton Friedman, pushed by business interests; and it was the result of a population who wanted to believe it; who wanted to be ethically lazy and stop helping other people and still feel good about themselves.

Ethics are socially bound, and are created and recreated by each generation.  To be sure, they are related to the means of production and the incentive system; but we create the incentive system. The executives of the 50s and 60s, by and large, chose something different than the executives of the 80s through today.

What has been chosen, can be changed.  If we want an economy which works for everyone, we can have it.

But we have to choose it, and we have convince or crush those who would chose otherwise.  And for those who wince at the word crush, remember, inequality means death and illness for many people.  The crushing has already happened, the class war occurred, and the rich won.  And the casualties are piling up.


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The Golden Rule: Why Bankers Are In Charge

In our society, we determine much behaviour, and most economic behaviour, through the medium of money. This is not universal: many societies have not used money as their main means of determining who received goods, but we do.

If someone receives money for doing something, it is also a message which says “do more of this.” The more money, the stronger the message.

The most potent message, and the strongest effect on behaviour, is when someone has the right to create money. Money, in our society, is created by borrowing. Banks and other financial institutions which have the right to lend thus have the right to create money. They have to have some form of collateral, even if that collateral is just an expectation of future earnings “great business idea, we’ll lend you money, and use your expected profits as our collateral.”

This money can be loaned out at multiples of the underlying asset. During the 2000s some brokerages were allowed multipliers (leverage) of over 40X. Even better, often whatever you buy with a leveraged loan can then be used as an asset for another round of leverage, leading to extremely high levels of effective leverage.

Some organizations also have access to very low interest rates: they can borrow at close to “prime” the rate the central bank offers to the very best credit risks. Major banks are amongst those who can borrow at this rate. They can then lend out to other people, again, at a higher interest rate, and with leverage.

If you, personally, could borrow money at 1% annual interest rate, and lend out ten times that, do you think you could make a profit? What is your mortgage rate? What is your credit card’s interest rate?

This is as close as it comes to free money, and it takes a special genius to lose money when given these advantages.

The first rule of money is the rule of profits: if a group of people are making more profits than everyone else, they will come to control more and more of the society. Not only can they buy up other companies, but they can afford to donate to politicians, give politicians and regulators cushy jobs between government gigs, and they can afford to set up think tanks and endow university chairs and buy newspapers and television stations and so on in order to control the dissemination of ideas.

In theory profits are supposed to be self-limiting. If an industry makes more money than other industries, outsiders should see an opportunity, start up businesses, compete and drive down prices.

In the real world, that doesn’t happen as often as it does in theory, because you can’t just start up a bank with access to the Central Bank’s window. You can’t easily start up new pharmaceutical businesses, because it’s vastly expensive and there are huge regulatory hurdles. And when it does happen, why would you compete? Why not take the outsize profits? Why would you drive down profits? How does that benefit you?

The other check is supposed to be diminishing returns. The more money you have, the harder it is to find something to invest in: you run out of mortgages, or you run out of businesses to invest in which can make those returns. This does work, somewhat. It is at the heart of why the financial collapse happened: there weren’t enough assets for all the money chasing them, so widespread fraud occurred (liars loans, for example) and many people were given loans who couldn’t pay them back, while artificial assets were created which were not worth what they were sold for. Eventually this collapsed, but because the financial industry had already bought the political world, they were bailed out at a cost of trillions.

Behaviour you reward, is repeated. Bankers made millions of dollars, personally, in bonuses. This told them that what they did was valued, and they should do more of it. They did.

The fact that Wall Street and Fleet Street salaries and bonuses were so large also made financial executives not care about the future. When you make millions in a few years: enough to live on for the rest of your life, in high style, it isn’t important if you’re driving the firm to bankruptcy. You don’t need the bank or the firm to be there, you’ve already made your mint.

Now, as a politician, if you do what the financial industry (or any other wealth industry) wants, they donate to your reelection campaign. They make sure your friends and family have jobs. They invite you to the best parties. And if you’re defeated, and have voted the right way, well, they’ll take care of you afterwards as well, with a cushy job. Bill Clinton, who deregulated Wall Street, is worth 100 million dollars.

Because bankers control a lot of money, they control what other people do.


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The problem of resistance to the oligarchy

is how to hurt their interests at an acceptable cost to those doing the harm.

The traditional answer to this was solidarity and martyrdom.  It is impossible to overstate how dangerous being a union activist right up to the middle of the 20th century was.  You had to accept that you would be beaten, jailed and possibly killed.  Violent confrontations with police and private cops were routine.  Outright battles were not unknown, as when miners squared off against the military in a multi-day battle with over ten thousand casualties.

Nor did the early unions wring their hands about violence, even “criminal” violence. Clarence Darrow was a union lawyer for years.  One of his most prominent cases was defending union members who set off explosives in a newspaper office, killing people in that office.  The unions did not abandon those workers, who had clearly committed what we would call terrorism: they hired a star lawyer, one of the best in the country, to defend them.

The general strike, even more than the strike, was another answer: just shut the entire economy down.  It was used because it inflicted real costs on employers: they still needed some workers. But a strike requires social solidarity: bringing in scabs must be socially unacceptable, either due to mores or because the scabs know they’ll have their kneecaps broken.  A general strike requires enough workers to be willing to do it to shut down an entire city, region, or country.

The Gandhian resistance method is very similar to general strikes: it requires hundreds of thousands to millions of people to be willing to shut down the economy and dare the police or army to kill or imprison them all.  When you have only a few hundred or thousand people, the police can deal with that easily enough: worst case they call in the national guard.  Hundreds of thousands: not so much.

What all of these actions had in common is that they genuinely hurt the interests of the rich where it mattered, in the pocketbook.

You can also get change through making the lives of the rich unpleasant, or making them fear for their very lives.  Social peace has often been bought by treating ordinary people better, when the rich genuinely feared the army and police couldn’t protect them.

But if the elites think that their security forces can protect them, and especially if they live in a bubble where they never have to face people whose lives they have made miserable, as is the case for most of our rich, who fly by private jet, travel about the city in helicopters or chauffered limos and live in gated enclaves; and if you can’t cost them any real money, why should they let you have any of the surplus of society beyond the bare minimum you need to remain useful to them? (Not to survive: as the cutting of food stamps in the US indicates, that’s not a priority for the oligarchy.)

Be clear that distribution of goods and money in an economy is almost entirely unrelated to any ethical idea of merit or deservedness.  The bankers, amongst the best paid people in the world economy, destroyed far more money than they earned in the 00s, and yet are still paid billions of dollars in bonuses every year.  They receive the money they do because they had the power to make the government make them whole after they lost everything, then the power to make the government make them even richer than before.  They control a bundle of valuable rights from the state: the right to borrow at prime, the right to value assets to model (fantasy); the right to huge leverage; and the right lend, which is how money is actually created in our economy (aka. they can print money.)

This is why they’re rich: not because they produce net value: they destroy value; but because they have the power to make the government do what they want it to do and to make it not prosecute them when they break the laws, and even to change the laws so they can take even more money.

Distribution in an economy is based, virtually entirely, on power. A group receives goods and money because it can force others to give it to them.  The libertarian fantasy of free markets and free choice is exactly that. They don’t exist today, they have rarely existed in the past, and to the extent they have existed they owe their existence entirely to government making sure they exist.  As soon as any group gains enough power to take over government, they do, and free markets cease to exist because they make the government give them special rights,whether those are rights to print money, borrow low and lend high, or so-called intellectual property rights that let them continue to profit from ideas created 80 years ago.

Power, power is all that matters.  Even distribution, or something close to it, happens only when there is relatively equality between groups in society or there is an existential threat to society which requires the willing participation of all parts of society.

If you ever want to see raises for ordinary people again, you must figure out how they will become powerful: and power means “what can they do to hurt people who cross them, hurt them really, really badly.”

Peace is the result of everyone knowing and believing in their hearts that if they break the conditions of the peace, others will react with overwhelming force.  When  it becomes clear that there is no cost for taking more of the pie, people will do so, and yes, did do so.

So: how do we punish the rich for what they have done?  How do we force them (not convince, force) to give up more of the surplus crated by society?


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The Power Parable

“The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must ” – Thucydides

Imagine that you have crawled out of the desert. You have not drunk in days, and if you do not have water soon you will die. Only one man has water, but he will not give it to you for free, he wants to be paid.

What is that water worth? To put it another way, what is your life worth?

One answer is that your life is worth everything you will ever earn, minus the cost of subsistence. The water-seller might say “if you die, you will never earn anything again. Therefore everything you earn is because I gave you water. So this water is worth your life’s income.”

Now you might not find life worth living under these circumstances, which amount to slavery. If the water-seller had many possible customers crawling out of the desert, he might find that too many people would rather die than pay, and might reduce his price somewhat to maximize his profit. If one quarter of people would rather die than pay, he might reduce the price to two-thirds of his customers life earnings, and see if most of them were willing to pay that.

Over time he might find that, knowing he’d take two-thirds, once saved his customers wouldn’t work very hard: just enough for subsistence and some alcohol, perhaps. So he might continue to experiment—how much could he take to maximize his profits?

But there is another possibility, back at the original bargain “your earnings, or your life?” What if you decide to take the water whether the water-seller wants you to have it or not? What if you’re willing to use violence? You’re weak, you might not win and if you lose you’re dead, but you might win and if you do you don’t have to pay anything. And if you win, you could start selling water yourself.

The water-seller has to take this into account. Which means he either has to reduce the price he charges so it’s not worth people trying to kill him, or he has to spend some of his profits on security. Thugs, pretty much.

But why pay for his own thugs? Why not pay government, and use its thugs? Everybody chips in some money, the government creates police and an army, and they make sure that customers don’t just take the water. They also solve another problem we hadn’t mentioned, making sure that people keep paying up later once they are no longer dying for thirst. The government enforces the water-seller’s contracts.

It should be pointed out that the water-payer is getting a lot more out of the governments thugs than most ordinary people are. Even if we assume the new police enforce all contracts and stop violence against everyone (as best they can), this guy has a lot more enforcement needs and a lot more people who want to kill him than an ordinary person. So even if everyone pays, say, 10% of income for the police, our water-seller is doing well out of this.

But why should the water-seller pay 10%? If the government has politicians whose money is separate from the government’s money, who can’t just use it as their purse, why not give them personally, say, 2% in gifts. That’s enough money to make them, personally, filthy rich. And they can lower water-seller taxes (after all, he saves lives and is a lynchpin of the economy) and raise them on other people. With a bit of work he might not pay any direct taxes, only gifts, and the rest of the population will pay for the enforcement of his contract rights. Yes, that reduces the post-subsistence money he gets from the people whose lives he saved, but for every dollar spent on enforcement he would have only gotten two-thirds anyway.

This is power pricing in a parable.

Back in the eighties I was very poor and did not have a phone. Ever try to get a job without a phone? It limits you to a set of very menial, low paying jobs. How much is a phone worth if you need it to get a better job? In the modern world, where job-hunting is done through the internet, how much is it worth to have email?

For years I didn’t have a credit card. I eventually got one because I needed to travel, and only the lowest grade of hotels will let you stay if you don’t have a credit card. Likewise you can’t rent a car without a credit card. How much is not having bedbugs and having blackout drapes and a good mattress worth to you? How much is being able to drive worth to you?

Let us say you live far from where you work, and there is no public transportation. How much can you be charged for gas before you refuse to pay? Probably just slightly less than the difference between your current job and the best paying job near where you live, minus whatever price you put on the annoyance of having to drive a long ways.

What if there aren’t any jobs near where you live that you can find because the economy is in a prolonged slump? How much can they charge you for gas, and repairs, and car insurance and driver’s license fees then? You have to have a car, you can’t make a living without it. Everyone who sells you something related to cars knows that.

There are two answers to these what-ifs. There’s the free market answer, and there’s the government-for-the-people answer.

The free market answer is that if it is easy for new suppliers of gas, or repairs, or insurance, to start a new business, if the current suppliers charge more than the cost of getting into the business, someone will start a new business and undercut them. The threat of that, and the actual occasional reality of that, will keep current suppliers from gouging you. If there are a lot of people selling, even without new people coming into the business, one of them may “betray” the others and sell for cheaper, so long as they can still make a profit (or to drive people out of the business they might sell for a loss, so they can later charge the full “power price”.)

The second answer is that the government says “that’s not fair” or “it is not in our interest to let you take such high profits, because it reduces economic activity and thus our tax base” and simply doesn’t allow businesses to take maximum profits.

If the government doesn’t stop it, and if the market doesn’t stop it, however, profit maximization will occur.

“What this is really worth to you is just slightly less than every dollar this will earn you or save you. And that’s what we’re going to charge.”

In the real world, of course, there are multiple demands on each consumer – food, water, housing, transportation, education, healthcare, entertainment. So even if in one field there is no government or market reason not to gouge, there is a limit to how much a business can gouge because there are so many businesses trying to do so.

But notice something about that list: food, water, housing, transportation, education, healthcare, entertainment—every one of those things, except entertainment, you either need to survive, or you need to maximize your income. You pretty much must have those things, so anyone who is in a position to take them away is in a position to profit maximize. Now, let us say that in many of those fields the businesses are constrained either by the market or the government so they can’t take almost all of the value of what they offer. In such a case, the field or fields which isn’t constrained is going to make much higher profits. So if water companies are not subject to the possibility of new competition, nor are they regulated that field is going to be making much higher profits than housing, food, education, healthcare and so on.

So every business wants other industries to be subject to regulation, and to be a free market, but they want themselves to be free of regulation and free of real competition. A small number of other firms in the industry, all of whom do business the same way, and none of whom seriously undercut each other is acceptable to profit maximizers, but if it is easy to enter their business, then there is a free market and that’s not good for profit maximization.

Whenever you see an industry where profits are routinely higher than the norm for the society there is a good chance it is neither properly regulated nor a free market.

Because ordinary citizens do not have market power, because they cannot individually break a major firm, they must take prices. If the phone company, or the water company sets a price, you pay, or you don’t have a phone, or water.

Now consumers do have power as a group. If large numbers of consumers move together they can destroy or make a company. However it’s hard for consumers to do this when there is collusion between companies. If they’re all basically the same, if the product and the service is the same, consumer revolts are unlikely, especially for any must-have products. You must have water, you must have food. If you want a good job you must have a phone and internet, and any place without good public transit, you must have a car.

Consumers have power as consumers in markets that are actually free, where there is actual competition. Citizens also have power to the extent that they have power in government, and thus can use government to control industry, either to make sure there are actual free markets, or to ensure that if there aren’t, they are regulated.

To go back to our initial example, if you come crawling out of the desert and anyone can give you water, not just one person or a few people colluding, you’ll probably get it for little more than it usually costs. Indeed, a good samaritan may give you wate for free. If the government is responsive to ordinary citizens sense of outrage and morality “that’s not fair!” then even if there is only one water-seller, the government won’t let him charge you more than anyone else.

Individual consumers are in a weak position. As consumers they have very little power. It is as citizens that they have power, and it is in actual free markets that the producers do not have enough power to take advantage of consumer weakness. Free markets, however, are very fragile things, and usually only exist if government makes sure they do, which comes back to consumers being weak, but citizens having power through government. Citizens who treat politics as consumption, however, will lose both power and prosperity.


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The Role of Violence and Coercion in Saving the World

It will be impossible to save the world from climate change without coercion.  The problem of climate change is a problem of common sinks and limited resources: the atmosphere can only absorb so much carbon, the seas only have so many fish and can only withstand us dumping so much plastic and other pollutants into them.  The world has only so many forests, and so on.

These are genuinely limited resources.  Dumping into them, or chopping them down, or overfishing them is an advantage to whoever does it: they can burn dirty (cheap) fuels, they can use plastic packaging consumers like, they can have fish to eat now.

It is rational, in the sense that you receive a benefit, to destroy the world. It is especially rational to do so if you expect to be dead before the costs come to bear, or if you think you can use your money to avoid the worst of climate change.

We have an additional problem: no one has jurisdiction over all of the atmosphere, all of the seas, all of the forests.  If country A decides not to pollute or dump or cut down forests, someone else can do more of that and gain a short term benefit.  And by short term benefit I mean “some of the decision makers and their friends will personally get rich.  Filthy, stinking, rich.”  (This is also one  problem with refusing to have high marginal taxation, capital taxes, estate taxes and corporate taxes.  People are less interested in destroying the world when they’ll only make a little bit off it.  The calculus does change somewhat.)

So how do you ensure that Brazil doesn’t destroy the rest of the Amazon, that Japan doesn’t radically overfish, or that the US doesn’t dump obscene amounts of carbon into the air per capita?

There are three essential approaches.  The first is bribery: we’ll pay you not to do this.  Up to a certain point this is necessary: if Brazilians can make more money chopping down jungle than keeping it around, why wouldn’t they? But everyone has the ability to do destroy the world, everyone can hold you hostage, and once people start, they don’t stop.  Bribery only works if it is short term, if it becomes “we’ll pay for you to transition to a different economic model, but no more than that.”

The second is incentives.  Why are the Brazilians chopping down the jungle?  Because Americans want to eat beef.  If Americans change how they eat, much less reason for the jungles to be chopped down.  If we don’t want plastic to destroy the Oceans maybe we should just forbid most plastic packaging?  It can be done, I grew up with paper bags and glass bottles, for example.  I grew up in a culture where every food worker didn’t wear disposable plastic gloves.  I survived, I guarantee you will too, no  matter how much of a germphobe you are.

The third is coercion.  You will not do this, and if you do we will do bad things to you.  Lock you up, sink your ships, and if it comes to it, kill you.

Now let’s be clear, coercion underlies virtually all social relations.  You pay taxes because if you don’t, somebody with a gun will come along and throw you in jail.  You have property because men with guns enforce your property rights.  You go to school, because if you don’t… well, you get the picture.  No society has EVER existed that did not have some form of coercion available to it.  In many hunter-gatherer societies that coercion was the simplest of all: expulsion.  If you didn’t obey the rules, they kicked you out, and that meant death because no, most people cannot survive alone, and most people don’t want to.

Because there is an advantage to unilateral betrayal: to dumping your pollution on other people and letting them pay the cost, there will always be people who want to do it, and it’s not always worth trying to use incentives to get them not to: it swiftly becomes too expensive.  The best approach is often to unilaterally take certain actions off the table: none of us will unilaterally take each others stuff.  None of us will dump poisons into the air that kill other people we don’t know.  None of us will, on net, allow forests to decrease.  None of us will use plastic packaging.

This is the problem of collective action: if none of us do these things, we’re all better off.  But if one of us or a few of us do it, we have an advantage over other people, and if other people are doing it, we need to do it to keep up.

This brings us to my comment, in my 44 Points Post about needing an armed force to protect the Oceans, a comment which caused much screaming, since people thought it violated my point about not wanting large standing armies.

An army and a police force are not the same thing.  An international “Ocean Guard” is not a navy, it does not need destroyers with depth charges and nuclear submarines with missiles and Aircraft Carriers.  It needs ships capable of find trawlers and boarding them.  Police force.

But the key problem here is jurisdiction: no one has jurisdiction.  No one can say to the US or China or India or Japan, “you will not do this!”

We must create institutions which have the authority to say “you will not pollute, you will not destroy the environment.”  More than that, because we have gone too far, we are going to need institutions which can say “and you will also work to fix the environment.”  Again, countries will want to not contribute, because if someone else does it, and you don’t, you get most of the benefits without the costs.

Now we can create a world economy which is not harmful to the environment and in which everyone is fed, clothed, has shelter and has a meaningful life with a good chance at happiness.  We are going to have to, because people who are unhappy, who do not love, and are not loved, who are frightened, will do whatever they feel they must.  We must drain the swamp of true need, of hunger, of great fear.

But that’s the end point: that’s where we must commit to go.  Along the way, however, bad actors will have to be forced to stop what they are doing coercively.

Failure to do so means death and suffering.  More death and suffering than is caused by coercively, say, sinking Trawlers or trade embargoing countries which won’t stop using plastic containers.  We are in a situation where the median death estimate from climate change is probably a billion people.

We cannot entirely bribe and incentivize ourselves our way out of this problem, some coercion will be necessary.  How much money would you have to pay Wall Street, for example, to stop doing what they do?  As much, or more than they make doing what they do.  How much to stop Big Oil?  Same answer.  We can’t afford it, that money, those resources, must be spent fixing the problem and taking care of ordinary people.  So we must criminalize certain behaviour, on a world scale and then enforce it.

That is policing, if done right, not military action.

There are great big reasons to be scared of anything that looks like a world state.  I have a preference for nations, because a world state that turns totalitarian is a nightmare, and a world state is also likely to lead to stagnation.  My suggestion is to try federalization: specific bodies with specific enforcement, but they must have transnational police powers.  There is no reason these bodies can’t be run by democratic methods, no reasons the courts they run can’t be fair and open. Our current transnational bodies aren’t democratic, indeed are anti-democratic, precisely because our elites don’t want them to be, but that is, again, a social choice.

We figure this problem out, or we fry.  We need institutions for transnational action, institutions with police power, courts and which are democratically constituted.  This isn’t an insoluble problem, either in general, or specific, except that it challenges the people who currently have power and who are currently getting filthy rich by destroying the environment, and in so doing likely killing a billion or more people, and conceivably, risking the future existence of humanity entirely.

Given the stakes, we’d best grow up.  There is only one world, and until we get off it, it is a single point of failure. It must be dealt with as such.

 

Incentives

Why The Republicans Shut The Government Down and Threaten the Debt Ceiling

HBR has an article by Justin Fox on the government shutdown in Washington in game theory terms.  It’s good as far as it goes, but it amounts to this:

  1. It works, they get some of what they want
  2. People keep doing what works.

Let’s add some more specifics.

The article mentions that the freezing of redistricting in most Republican states means that Republicans can’t lose the House.  What it fails to mention is this: they can lose their seats by losing the primary.  The Tea Party (unlike progressives) is very good at winning primaries.  Even if they don’t succeed in a primary challenge, their challenges are serious, and politicians don’t want to chance it.  Fighting a challenge is expensive, risky and time consuming.

Fox notes that Obama has repeatedly given in.

But has he?  Remember the famous FDR comment, “I agree with you, now make me do it?”

Obama has a long record of statements and actions which indicate he wants a lower deficit, wants to cut back on entitlement and spending and desires a grand bargain.

Were Republicans making him do things he really didn’t want to do?  Perhaps he might have chosen to do things somewhat differently (he wants mostly spending cuts but at least some new taxes, they want no new taxes).  But the goals of the Republicans (cut entitlements and the deficit) and Obama’s goals (cut the deficit and entitlements) aren’t that far apart.  What they differ on is the exact way in which it should be done.

Obama agreed to past debt negotiation events because he wanted to. He did have other options.  He could simply declare that the constitution says that debts must be paid, argue that one law (the debt-ceiling) does not outweigh another (the budget) and tell the treasury to keep on keeping on.  There is nothing the House, alone, could do about that.

Obama, in other words, to use a game theory term, has a unilateral move: something he can do that cannot (or will not) be stopped by other actors.  His BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated settlement) is to simply tell the House to suck it and keep spending.  He chose not to do so.

When you’re dealing with game theory you have to consider all the players possible moves and their goals.  Obama and the Republicans have been in an extended negotiation over not whether to do a Grand Bargain cutting entitlements or whether to cut the deficit, but what that bargain will look like and how the deficit will be cut.

Add in one more player: Democrats.  Obama cannot, using just Democratic votes, get the entitlement cuts he wants, this was true even when Democrats controlled the House.  Republicans can vote for entitlement cuts and get reelected, too many Democrats can’t.  To slash Social Security and Medicare Obama must have Republican votes.

In other words, this multi-year session of threats about the debt limit, the government shutdown, the furloughs, is a multi-year negotiation between Obama and Republicans.

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