Nota bene: my second essay on Russia will be posted tomorrow.
Before NATO invaded Kursk–and make no mistake, it was a NATO incursion by proxy–the Ukraine was not in any existential danger. Now, however, words this evening from former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, “you’ll know it when you see it and you’ll see it soon,” make it abundantly clear that the peace will be dictated by Russia.
Full stop.
No third party intercessors, except maybe China. Non-zero chance for India.
But for the West and NATO? How you like that crow you pack of corrupt idiots? Y’all make Tommy “Catastrophic Success” Franks look like a modern day Sherman.
After Russia either forces a humiliating retreat of NATO from Kursk, or surrounds and destroys the NATO manned (Polish, French and Ukrainian troops) and armed (Bradleys, HIMARS, M1-Abrams, Leopards and more) brigade, it is an absolute certainty that Russia will level Kiev and Lvov, á la Grozny. Further, understand, the Ukraine will lose territory in a line from Sumi in the north through Poltava, Dnipro on the east bank of the Dnieper River, Zaporizhzhiya, then south across to Kherson, Mikolaiv and finally the entire Oblast of Odessa. What remains is a landlocked rump, near-failed Ukrainian state and the corrupt Comedian-cum-Dictator Zelensky will be gone. The Ukraine will then be dependent on Russian good-will. Remember, all Russia asked for was Ukrainian neutrality before the war.
Sovereign neutrality versus suzerainty? I know what I would have chosen.
This is the first in a series of articles on Russian grand strategy.
As sure as the sun rises in the East and sets in the West, modern¹ Russian wars begin in a dog’s dinner of disruption and disarray. From the naked aggression of Peter the Great in 1700 against the Swedish Empire² to the present “Special Military Action” that began with significant Russian rollbacks along the entire front, except Crimea, every modern Russian war witnesses their army fall into a fog of confusion and calamity in the first weeks, months and even years against their foe.
Just as certain as rains are to Ireland and ice and snow are to Siberia, however, the Russian army, general staff, politicians and the populace united remain innovative, cunning and intellectually agile: native, instinctual qualities in Russians that are not to be underestimated. Recall, Russia put the first human into space! Just like every other nation, Russian generals come in all stripes. But Russia’s special genius consistently germinates what I call the “learning general.” A learning general makes mistakes, often grievous ones. His hallmark, however, is simple: he never makes the same mistake twice, thereby transmuting fear of failure into audacity in the face of risk and ultimately into victory.
Ulysses S. Grant personifies the modern American example of how devastating a learning general can be. (George Washington was also a learning general.) Patton, Bradley, MacArthur, and Eisenhower were all operationally competent, but not a one of them was a learning general like Sam Grant.
A mediocre student at West Point but something of a standout in the Mexican-American War, Grant was ejected from the army while garrisoning California. All he subsequently touched as a civilian ended in failure, once even reduced to chopping and hauling wood into town that he might, at the very least, feed his family. Of course there is the old lamentable slander that Grant was a drunk, but drunks win wars not.
After the April 12, 1861 assault on Ft. Sumter, Grant quickly sought a renewed post in the army. He said, “there are but two parties now. Traitors and Patriots.”³ With the help of Rep. Elihu Washburne, Grant was commissioned a colonel in command of 21st Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment on June 14, 1861. By August 5 he was Brigadier General of volunteers. Within months he had captured Paducah, Kentucky, and soon displaced General Fremont. Quickly sizing up his enemy, he beat him handily at Fort Henry on the Tennessee River. Ft. Donelson on the Cumberland River was another matter.
First, Grant underestimated enemy strength but quickly recovered, not, however before he failed to close his right flank allowing Nathan Bedford Forest and 700 men to escape. Gathering more forces in defiance of his commanding officer Henry Halleck he soon bulldozed Ft. Donelson into “unconditional and immediate surrender” on February 16, 1862. Grant’s was the first major victory in the American Civil War and he was promoted to Major General by President Lincoln during the week of March 3, 1862.
At Shiloh Grant failed to order his soldiers to entrench in the face of heavy Confederate reinforcements. Unprepared for a bloody Confederate surprise attack, it was only after consulting Sherman that he won the next day with a bold counterstroke that sacrificed thousands. Later in the war came the slaughter at Cold Harbor, followed by an attack on World War One type enfilading fields of fire that destroyed 85% of a Maine regiment in less than twenty minutes at Petersburg. Lastly, the Battle of the Crater.
Grant rose to the highest of commands not in spite of his mistakes, but because he never made the same mistake twice: the defining quality of a learning general. Most men cannot handle a single failure in life. But of life’s most valuable lessons, learning from failure, is the most salutary of all. A general who learns from his mistakes soon grows confident and mature in the face of risk. And with confidence growing the battlefield becomes an enemy boneyard. By the close of the war Grant captured three armies, one at Ft. Donelson, one at Vicksburg and one at Appomattox. He missed a fourth by a whisker at Chattanooga.
***
Three great wars. Three catastrophic beginnings. Three exemplary victories. The Great Northern War of 1700-1721, Napoleon’s Grand Armée of 1812 and the great hubris of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941. Each war birthed in calamity. Each war culminated in total victory. Each won by a learning general.
It is commonplace to view the wars of Russia’s past through the prism of craquelure, but this view is in error. The Great Northern War fought between 1700-1721 is as relevant now as it was in 1812 or 1941.
In 1700 Peter the Great invaded the Swedish Empire with an army reformed along European lines. Gone were the steppe warriors, the streltsy, a rag tag feudal lot armed with a pike and an arquebus. Their hereditary forebears, mounted archers, defeated the Mongols at their own game. (Even then the Russians were a learning lot.) Peter’s new model army exchanged Parthian shot† for musket barrage and charge of cold steel.
The war began well for the Swedes, poorly for the Russians. The first battle at Narva, November 30, 1700 was a disaster in every way, except one. Peter’s command structure was a tapestry of confusion. Seeking reinforcements Peter was not even on the field of battle when Charles XII, king of Sweden arrived. Moreover, Peter’s army was too green: entire regiments fell, raked by musket and cannon balls, retreating ignominiously within earshot of the enemy howls of a bayonet charge. Only the Preobrezhinksy and Semyenovsky Regiments held fast, formed squares and fought on while the other twenty-nine regiments of Peter’s army surrendered to Charles XII.
Preternaturally gifted towards warfare Charles XII destroyed Peter’s allies, ad seriatim, forcing a separate peace on both Denmark-Norway and the Saxon-Polish-Lithuanians by 1707. Meanwhile, Peter learned many a hard lesson, but three will suffice: he simplified his command structure, he blooded his armies, and finally, beguiled would-be invaders in and then scorched the earth. Charles XII, emboldened by his victories over Peter’s allies invaded Russia in 1708. Peter retreated into the vastness of mother Russia until the winter of 1708/09 arrived. For the first, but not last time, the cold arctic air manifested two of Russia’s most unforgiving generals: January and February. By spring’s arrival Charles XII’s supply lines were dangerously over-extended, his army near exhaustion. Nine years after his Swedish land grab, Peter led his army to victory over Charles XII at the Battle of Poltava on July 8 1709. Although the war between the Sweden and Russia was not officially over, Poltava was decisive and had so disrupted the balance of power in central Europe that his original allies (self-aggrandizers who had signed a separate peace with Sweden) rejoined the fight so as to grab their piece of the once formidable Swedish Empire.‡
One-hundred and three years later, on June 24, 1812 Napoleon crossed the Niemen River into Russia with 450,000 men under arms. The flat-footed Russian High Command had no answer to this brazen act of aggression. After weeks of forced marches Napoleon won at Vitebsk and then smashed whatever confidence Russian General Barclay de Tolly had left when he captured the fortress city of Smolensk. Russian General Bagration (actually a Georgian) was faulted for not relieving Barclay de Tolly and both were sacked in favor of veteran of the Ottoman wars, Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov. Kutzov, loathed by the Czar Alexander I, learned the art of war after multiple blunders in three Russo-Turkish wars which preoccupied Russia prior to Napoleon’s invasion. Napoleon’s troubles soon began in earnest as Kutuzov employed scorched earth tactics and near-guerilla style attritional warfare against Napoleon and his Marshals. Weeks more of forced marches befell Napoleon’s Grand Armée, until Kutuzov wheeled around on September 7, 1812 at Borodino and fought Napoleon. It was a bloody Pyrrhic victory for the French. The Russian army survived intact to fight another day. Seven days later Napoleon and his now depleted army of 100,000 captured an arson-scorched Moscow. Napoleon howled imprecations at the Czar as Moscow burned, “the barbarians, the savages, to burn their city like this! What could their enemies do that was worse than this? They will earn the curses of posterity.”¤ His logistics shattered, Napoleon had no choice but to retreat, losing all but 35,000 of his once 450,000 strong army. Napoleon’s aura on invincibility destroyed, Kutuzov’s army had turned the tide.
Fast forward, in the argot of internet America, one-hundred twenty-eight years, three-hundred and sixty-three days to June 22, 1941. Three million, eight hundred thousand men, three-thousand seven-hundred ninety-five tanks, twenty-three thousand pieces of artillery, over thirty-thousand mortars, five-thousand six-hundred and seventy-nine aircraft and over one-million two-hundred thousand horses and vehicles under the aegis of Operation Barbarossa invade the Soviet Union. Their objective was the A-A line, a straight line running from Archangelsk to Astrakhan. Lebensraum. By late August Kiev had fallen, soon too had Minsk and the Baltic states. Leningrad was besieged. All of the crucial Donbass region gone and so too the Sea of Azov. Army Chief of Staff, Zhukov was sacked and sent to the rear to command reserves. The Wehrmacht’s Operation Typhoon came within 87 miles of Moscow in late September when Stalin threw 800,000 (83 divisions) men at the Germans. Only 25 of the divisions were at effective strength, but they were just enough to hold the Germans to within 15 miles of the capital. Multiple crack Siberian divisions, who had beaten the Japanese at Khalkin Gol, counterattacked and drove the Germans back a hundred miles. With supply lines and entire army groups in disarray Hitler order retrenchment and reorganization. The drive to Moscow ground to a halt.
In desperation, Stalin recalls his most effective general to plan a new counter-offensive. Striding onto center stage comes the titan: one Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov. His early failures during Operation Barbarossa hardened him and prepared him to deal with the capricious autocrat Stalin. He quickly conceived Operation Uranus (Stalingrad) and Mars (Rzhev Salient) and put them into motion simultaneously. His double envelopment of Paulus’ Sixth Army at Stalingrad conjured the ghost of Hannibal at Cannae, 2,140 years before. But the Battle of the Rzhev Salient was an operational defeat. Lesson learned: no multiple operations simultaneously. A learning general, Zhukov then went on to best the tactics and strategy of Hannibal at Cannae a second time laying a well-prepared trap the along the Kursk Salient.
Some scholars claim the idea of a trap at Kursk was General Rokossovsky’s (error corrected ~spk) idea. But I believe that to be untrue. The idea, aforementioned, was developed by Zhukov who brooded over the failure of the Rzhev Salient during Operation Mars. He learned from that mistake and employed the lesson at Kursk. Here, finally, was the epic battle of World War Two; the Poltava, the Borodino, Maloyaroslavets, Vyazma and Berizina campaign. Here, the Soviets ripped the guts out of the Wehrmacht and decided the fate of the Nazis. It remains the single largest battle in the history of human warfare. The entire Soviet populace within a hundred miles participated weeks before in laying the trap for the Nazis. Mothers and sons dug tank traps, ditches, machine gun and mortar nests, wrangled murder holes out of raw concrete just laid. This they did for their husbands, fathers, elder sisters and brothers all of whom were manning tanks, mortars, rifles, machine guns, artillery and planes. At Kursk the Russians gave no quarter to the Nazis and zero magnanimity in their defeat. It was total war and mass slaughter on a scale not even I want to contemplate.
***
Charles XII can be forgiven for invading Russia. No precedent existed for Russia’s behavior, especially in a Westphalian world order. But for Napoleon the precedent was all too clear. Hubris makes fools of great and evil men alike. Napoleon is the rule, not the exception. The same can be said of Hitler. His actions uncorked the rule, just as Odysseus’ shipmates uncorked and subsequently reaped the whirlwind.
Aside from Russia’s propensity to propel learning generals to the fore, there is another theme running, unsaid, through these three wars. Three wars saw their vital interests, existential in nature, threatened. How did Russia win such violent, destructive wars that laid waste to thousands of miles and killed millions of people? The question of Russian grand strategy and why they are fighting in the Ukraine will be addressed in my next post. Until then, a Russian proverb, a hint: “All Roads lead to Rome, but the road to Moscow is a matter of choice.”
Choice indeed.
———–Footnotes———-
1: Modern Russia begins when Peter the Great inserted his nation into the Westphalian System upon entering the Great Northern War of 1700-1721.
2: At the time, the Baltic was a Swedish lake. Virtually all the lands surrounding the Baltic were sovereign Swedish land. And Peter the Great was hungry for a Baltic port, which he founded in 1703: Saint Petersburg.
3: Brands, 2012, p. 123.
†: A “Parthian Shot” is a horse archer in feigned retreat turning his body backwards firing a recurved bow at full gallop at an enemy in pursuit. “Parting shot” is a modern English idiomatic derivative of “Pathian Shot.”
‡: Sweden fought for another twelve years. Russia did not sign a separate peace, like his allies had before him. Peter honored his treaty obligations with his partners to the letter.
¤: Mikabridze, 2014, p. 92.
Kelley lives in San Antonio, Texas. He has a Bachelor’s degree in European History, and two Master’s: International Relations and Political Economy and another in History, focusing on the medieval trade routes of Inner Asia.
Doesn’t seem to be much question: they’re hitting dams (not to destroy the dam, I suspect, to take out the hydropower and the river crossing point) and various other power infrastructure, night after night.
This is something they hadn’t done before: there had been some attacks, but nothing systematic.
This isn’t a new tactic: in the 90s Gulf War, the US took out nineteen of twenty power plants, which led to water treatment and supply issues, which lead to c. one million deaths from cholera. To this day Iraq doesn’t have enough power. They also directly hit water infrastructure, and they used similar tactics in the 2000s Iraq war.
One of the “good” things about the Ukraine war until now is Putin’s refusal to get down into the mud with such tactics, and I’m disappointed he’s now done so. There is some military case: the railroads are electrified, for example, and Russia is getting ready for a huge offensive, probably starting in May.
Of course, after what the US and the EU have condoned in Palestine, they are in no position to complain about such “relatively” mild actions. Putin isn’t trying to cause a famine and commit genocide and the profile of deaths is far different: the Israelis killed more children in a month than both sides in the Ukraine war have killed in years.
An effect of this is going to be another huge wave of refugees to Europe. Pragmatically, though not ethically, this puts more pressure on the Europeans and I’m sure Putin knows that and wants it to happen.
The war is reaching its endgame. Russia is going to crush Ukraine then enforce the peace they want. I would assume they’ll take Odessa and the entire coast, and otherwise just the Russian majority regions and the land bridge, but they’ll conquer far more of that to force Ukraine and the US to the table.
Ukraine will be a complete basket case after the war, and rebuilding will be done on standard neoliberal debt and looting terms. Meanwhile, there will be far more women than men.
The war should have ended a couple months after it started. Ukraine would have ended in far better shape and hundreds of thousand of soldiers would be alive.
But that’s not what the West wanted, and why should they care, after all. They were, and are, fighting to the last Ukrainian.
Russian troops are now advancing across almost the entire front. It’s slow, but steady. There are no defensive lines built to stop them, the best they’re likely to get is the use of rivers.
Ukraine clearly no longer has enough men or ammunition.
Macron and some other European leaders have discussed sending troops, but sending them to fight Russia is insanity, and hopefully they can see that, since WWIII will suck.
But there’s one play they may feel they can get away with.
Send in “Peacekeepers”. Have them advance to the borders of Russian areas, and use them to secure Odessa and say “we are just separating the combatants.” It’s a way to limit Ukrainian geographical losses and avoid it becoming a land-locked country and the Europeans just bet that Putin isn’t willing to risk or start a war with Europe and/or NATO.
How likely is this? I don’t know. But of the various insane options, it seems the most likely.
According to SEMI’s market research group, China isn’t slowing down. SEMI is forecasting China’s capacity to keep growing at a significant rate over the next few years. For 300mm, SEMI expects China to have 29% of the worldwide capacity in 2026, increasing from 21% in 2022 (Figure 2). The 200mm capacity is expected to grow from 16% to 24%. And foundry capacity is expected to reach 42% in 2026 up from 27% in 2022, outpacing the Taiwan foundry capacity expansions.
China has its goal set on being more chip-independent and spending less than $300 billion a year on importing semiconductors. To accomplish these goals, they are spending a lot of money on fabs and equipment, and in some cases forming JVs to get the right chips for their industries. So, will the European and US CHIPS Acts help to increase Europe’s and the US’s capacity? A little, but as Peter Wennink recently commented, the EU chip goal is unrealistic. I’ll add in as is the CHIPS Act in the US. China has a significant head start and it will take significant investment by the EU and US to catch up, and it is unlikely politicians and shareholders will continue to fund the exercise to reach the desired goal of 20%. (my bold)
The bad news for equipment companies outside of China is that due to sanctions against foreign companies selling certain types of equipment, as well as China trying to create an independent chip market, Chinese semiconductor equipment companies are seeing above-market growth. Naura Technology, AMEC, and ACM Research at mid-year of 2023 are seeing 68%, 27%, and 47% growth respectively over 2022. Most of this is driven by the China market.
The Chinese, pre-sanctions, were not pushing indigenous chip capacity. Chinese companies preferred American, Taiwanese and US chips, seeing them as more reliable than domestic alternatives.
A chip act might have made sense IF the US was genuinely going to re-shore production, far beyond chips or IF it was going to go to war within the next two to three years.
As it is, all it will accomplish in the end is losing the Western absolute advantage in chips and transferring the market leading position to China.
Which brings us to this beautiful, semi-related bit of news:
This is great news. Daleep has already helped this Administration navigate some tough challenges, and there’s no kinder or more capable colleague. https://t.co/6OiywjPuA9
The effect of anti-Russia sanctions was to make Russia into the world’s fifth largest economy while massively ramping up their weapons production and overall growth rate. Germany has slipped to sixth and Russia is now a firm Chinese ally. It is true that America is making more money by supplying Europe with expensive fossil fuels, but by any rational assessment, anti-Russia sanctions strengthened America’s self-declared enemies, and weakened its allies.
In other words, the policy that Daleep was the architect of was a disaster. Yet he is lauded as capable rather than as a complete fuckup. To be fair, I suppose, he was undoubtedly following orders, but he owns the orders he follows unless he objected to them and predicted their failure.
All of this applies, times ten, to anyone involved in the anti-China sanctions, which have backfired catastrophically.
America, land of the highly paid incompetent fuck up.
I think this is worth listening to. I’ve put notes below. It’s not in essay format, just what I found significant as I was listening.
Whatever you think of Putin, at least he’s educated and speak in complete sentences and has a historical understanding (whether you agree with it or not.) He makes Trump and Biden look like the idiots they are.
In fact, Putin makes almost every Western leader look like an ill-educated moron. Orban is an exception. This isn’t a political judgment. I don’t much like Putin, but I can respect him. I can’t respect Biden, Trump, Sunak, Scholz, Macron, Von Der Leyen or my own PM, Trudeau.
Fuck, I’m loving this history lesson from Putin “oh, and here are copies of the historical documents, showing I’m not making this up.”
And Tucker’s expression, looking at Putin is hilarious. Absolutely “WTF, why is he giving me this history lesson.” How many politicians has he interviewed over the years, and this erudite (though really very much a skim) disquisition is alien to him.
Tucker’s kind of stupid, “but we have a strong China the West isn’t very afraid of”. I mean, WTF?
Putin’s point that Russia in 90s and much of the 00s wanted to be part of the West, desperately so, is entirely accurate by my memory and I was around.
Russia /should/ have been turned into a Western ally, and if it had been, China would be /much/ less of a threat. But our politicians (I won’t call them statesman, the last US statesman was James Baker) were fools.
And yes, the war against Serbia was the first great break in Russia’s trust of the West and that the West would obey international law. If Serbia can be broken up, well, why not other countries?
And yes, I remember that Russia asked to join NATO. What a different world that would be.
Pointing out that the US exerts pressure and Western countries obey, which is usually true, and has become more true.
Under Bush, the CIA confirms they are working to support the Chechen rebellion. Of course, Putin and Russia don’t like that.
And then the missile defense system, Putin offers to make it a multilateral defense system which is supposedly against Iran. America refuses.
Russia points out that if they aren’t in the missile defense system, they’ll have to find a way to overwhelm the new defense system–which they did: hypersonic missiles.
And, of course, NATO expansion makes the Russians feel unsafe, which, of course it does, when they won’t let Russia join NATO.
And the point that you can’t make a deal with Europeans, because they will bow to American pressure. But you can’t make a deal with America, because they won’t keep their word.
And Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO is a no go for Russia.
Talking about the coup-d’etas in Ukraine. Which, of course, there was and I said so at the time.
Ukraine can’t have a free trade agreement with both Russia and the EU at the same time since Russian market would be flooded. (Yeah, 100%. Would have been a disaster for Russia. Plus a route for operatives to infiltrate Russia easily though Putin doesn’t say that.)
Russia tells Yanukovich not to use armed force, because US agrees to calm down Maidan. But US doesn’t keep their deal, force is used by Maidan, and the coup happens.
The Ukrainian attacks on Donetsk are the main break point to Putin.
But also, gaurantees against the coup were ignored by the European countries. Again, a loss of trust. Can’t make a deal with the West, especially Europe.
NATO in Ukraine is the red line. (Which is what I always said.)
Then breaking the Minsk agreements. Again, the West and Ukraine won’t keep agreements with Russia.
From Putin’s POV he didn’t start the war in 2022. The war was ongoing, Minsk agreement broken, Donetsk under constant attack. He intervened, yes, but the war was already ongoing.
(Not unreasonable. I warned at the time and indeed for decades that this would happen.)
This Putin/Carlson interview is super embarassing to the West. I literally can’t think of a Western leader today who could lay out a case like this, coherently and intelligently. We are ruled by imbeciles.
I mean, I don’t agree with a lot of Russian policy, or how they’re going social conservative. But goddamn, Putin makes our leaders look like incompetents.
Putin claims that he withdrew from Kiev at western request, as a requirement for making a peace deal. As soon as the Russians did, the West ended the peace talks.
Nasty if true and yet another, never trust these fucks and impose a peace by winning the war.
Unfortunately, I find this credible. I don’t know if it’s true, but I believe Putin more than UK PM Johnson or Biden.
Putin: Ukraine’s national identity is based around glorification of Nazi collaborators as heroes, and de-Nazification means ending this national identity.
De-Nazification would be done by making Nazi and Neo-Nazism illegal in Ukraine, in the peace treaty, per Putin.
Putin hasn’t talked directly to Biden since the start of the war and sees no reason to do so.
Putin: US blew up Nord Stream: motive and ability.
Putin: Germany’s leaders are not looking after Germany’s interests primarily.
World should be safe for everyone, not just the “golden billion”.
Using dollar as weapon is one the biggest strategic mistakes of the US. (Putin)
US dollar as trade/reserve dollar, allows US inflation under control, and damaging it by using it as sanctions is a grave mistake. Even US allies are downsizing dollar reserves.
Until 2022, 80% of Russian trade was in US dollars. Now 13%.
Denies fear of Chinese economic power. China’s foreign policy is not aggressive, but looks for compromise. China/Europe economic cooperation is growing faster than China/Russia cooperation.
Bilateral trade with China is 230 billion, and is well balanced. 1992 G7 – 47% of trade, now a little over 30%. Brics only 16%, now higher than G7.
US does not understand the world is changing and does not adapt because of conceit. Trying to resist with force is failing and will fail.
President does not matter, what matters is the elite mindset. As long as American elites believe in domination at any costs the US cannot adapt.
Largest number of sanctions in the world are against Europe and at the same time Russia became 5th largest world economy and the 1st largest in Europe.
Russia can’t really understand the power centers and elections in the US.
US never seems to cooperate, but always to use pressure. In relation to US, cold war elites just kept doing the same thing, and assuming they could win the same way against China as they had against the USSR.
Definitely thinks the US deliberately provoked the Russian invasion. They controlled Ukraine and Ukraine ignore Minsk, talking about joining NATO and attacking Russians in Donetsk/Luhansk and discriminating against Russians in Ukraine.
Believes Zelensky was scared of neo-Nazis when he took charge, and realized the West supported the Neo-Nazis.
Weird series of questions on religion, like “do you see God in human history today”.
Putin: history has its laws and rhythms. Rise and fall.
Some talk on genetic sciences and AI as a threat.
Musk and others involved in AI and genetics need to be regulated.
This should be done by an international treaty.
Russia is willing to negotiate, it is the West who is refusing to negotiation: Ukraine is under US control.
Ukraine cannot defeat Russia strategically, even with NATO support, so it only makes sense to negotiate.
Putin: I know they want to negotiate, but they don’t know how to do so. But it will happen sooner or later.
The war is particular tragic, because to Putin, Ukraine and Russia are still a single civilization with a single soul.
Final Commentary: As I said at the start, Putin makes most Western leaders look like dunces. He can discuss history, economy and politics fluently. He has numbers and dates and analogies at his fingertips.
And yes, as far as I’m concerned, Russia was treated incompetently by the West. They could easily have been made into Western allies, effectively a part of Europe. Moving NATO forward was obviously a threat to Russia when Russia had been promised it wouldn’t happen and when Russia even offered to join NATO.
The bottom line here is that Ukraine appears to be running out of both infantry and ammunition and Russia has plenty of both, plus air superiority. Ukraine is now bringing in more women, and is trying to convince EU countries to return Ukrainian refugee men so they can be conscripted.
There isn’t much map movement, but that doesn’t matter, what will happen is that the Russians will keep depleting Ukrainian forces until there simply aren’t enough, then they will leap forward and take a vast amount of terrain unless Ukraine gives them what they wants before then.
With the Ukrainian military broken, and the Russian army able to advance as it pleases, Russia will be able to dictate surrender terms, and that is what they will be. At the least: all Russian speaking areas, the coast, Crimea and the land bridge and Austrian style neutrality.
It should be pointed out that unless NATO is willing to declare war, the US has no leverage.
There’s nothing America (the EU will just do what the US tells it to) can give Russia that matters: Russia doesn’t need sanctions relief and is better off without it: their economy is doing better because of the sanctions forcing internal development than it did before the sanctions. (Yes, folks, despite what you’ve been told all you lives, free trade with everyone is stupid and always has been.)
Russia is winning, Russia will win, this was always obviously going to be the case.
May 16, 2022 I wrote who would win and lose from the Ukraine war. Re-read the article. For all intents and purposes I got everything right, except that Russia has benefited even more economically and my “marginal victory” was wrong: Russia is winning a significant victory, strategically speaking.
Sanctions will force more import substitution and help overcome the “resource curse”, making it cost-effective to make more things in Russia
If you want to know the future, read me. I don’t get everything right, no on does, but I get far more right than most.
An oligarchy, as we use the word today (the dictionary definition is different) is rule by the rich, because they are rich. (A feudal king may be rich, but his power is not primarily a result of his wealth, but rather his wealth is primarily a result of his power.)
In the summer of 2000, Putin met in the Kremlin with about two dozen of the men regarded as the top oligarchs. The meeting was closed, but reports later said he made them a sternly clear deal: Stay out of politics and your wealth won’t be touched…
…
By then, Berezovsky had already begun criticizing Putin. Within months, he left Russia for the United Kingdom and was granted asylum in 2003. Ten years later, he was found dead in his home; a disputed post-mortem examination said he appeared to have hanged himself.
Gusinsky, whose media holdings were critical of Putin and even satirized him, was hauled into jail amid an investigation of misappropriated funds; within weeks, he agreed to sell his holdings to an arm of Russia’s state natural gas monopoly, and he left the country.
Khodorkovsky, regarded as Russia’s richest man at the time, lasted longer, establishing the Open Society reformist group and showing increased political ambitions. But he was arrested in 2003 when special forces stormed onto his private plane and spent a decade in prison on convictions of tax evasion and embezzlement before Putin pardoned him and he left Russia.
I remember reading an article where one of the oligarchs shut down a factory and there was great protest. Putin not only forced the oligarch to re-open the factory, he was there when the oligarch made the announcement, glaring at him and treating him with contempt.
The oligarchs are not in control of Putin or the Russian government (though they have some influence at the provincial and civic levels.)
Now the AP article points out something very smart: that Putin is creating a new group of oligarchs loyal to him, by giving them resources seized from foreign countries leaving Europe. Smart to notice, and smart of Putin, though his successors may regret it. In a way this is very similar to feudalism, though it involves money and resources not armed men and land.
The new oligarchs will be loyal to Putin and probably this successor. Their children may well not be loyal to Putin’s successor’s successor, however, and that person will have to show the whip hand or cut a deal, or both. If they ever succeed in taking control of the government (and they will eventually if the system continues) then it will be very bad for Russians, same as oligarchic control of the US has been very bad for Americans. A “King” often uses the commons against the nobility and thus supports the commons to some extent, a king who is ruled by the nobles acts with them against the commoners.
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Let’s add another data point: Russia has vastly ramped up its military production. The US could not do so, the companies who make the weapons said they’d do it, but have been very slow about it because they make more money that way. In Russia, however, in 2022, Medvedev, Putin’s lieutenant stated:
“The goal has been set for a scrupulous execution of the government’s defense contracts in all of its key parameters, [and] prevention of disruptions in the supply of equipment,” he wrote on Telegram. “Attention has been drawn to the fact that all contractors could be held to account, including on criminal charges… Supervision over the execution will continue.”
Although I can’t find it, in another case he gathered them together and explained to them what Stalin did to those who didn’t make production quotas.
You can’t get clearer, or more threatening than that.
Russia’s weapon manufacturers serve the state. They make a profit and those who run them are allowed to become rich, but only if they meet their quotas.
Russia is a modern imperial system, similar to the early Roman one. The governors are hand chosen by Putin from his loyalists (he likes ex-bodyguards) and the bourgeoisie serve him. When Wagner rebelled, not one governor supported their rebellion, even in the first 24 hours when they seemed to be doing well.
America is an oligarchy, Russia has an emperor. The emperor is old, and the question is who will be his successor, which is why key lieutenants like Medvedev and Kadyrov (the governor of Chechnya) are competing in loyalty and fervor.
Both countries have elections, in both countries the elections have little effect most of the time, though their existence does allow the possibility of change thru them. In America, the leader changes, but since Reagan, the fundamental policies haven’t. In Russia, well, Putin is always re-elected, though it is also true that he has always been popular in Russia, with his opposition a minority.
Indeed, that opposition, largely urban professional types, are weaker now than ever, with many of them leaving Russia due to the war.
Putin, like the kings we discussed above, uses the commons against the nobility, to help keep them in check. He does care about his popularity.
So, again, the US is a nominal democracy which is actually a plutocratic oligarchy, and Russia is a nominal democracy which is actually an imperial system without family succession.
